In 2003, through exotic pet importation, 35 people in six US states were confirmed to have been infected with the clade II type of the monkeypox virus. The humans contracted the disease from infected prairie dogs, kept as pets, that had themselves been exposed to either contaminated imported animals or other individuals infected with the virus. All human cases made a full recovery without lasting effects.
This outbreak was an odd, self-limited, and entirely incidental occurrence of a rare and essentially non-lethal virus finding its way to the US by specific and preventable circumstances. In a world of sensible and ethical public health practices, this event should have prompted a reasonable, proportionate response, such as increased precautions regarding the exotic animal trade.
Instead, this incident opened the floodgates to dangerous research by scientists who sought to identify a strain of monkeypox that could easily be passed to humans by way of aerosol transmission.
The House Committee’s conclusions on Fauci’s NIAID as a whole are damning:
The primary conclusion drawn at this point in the investigation is that NIAID cannot be trusted to oversee its own research of pathogens responsibly. It cannot be trusted to determine whether an experiment on a potential pandemic pathogen or enhanced potential pandemic pathogen poses unacceptable biosafety risk or a serious public health threat. Lastly, NIAID cannot be trusted to honestly communicate with Congress and the public about controversial GOFROC experiments. (page 8)
To summarize: in nature, monkeypox disease is a relatively rare, usually mild viral illness transmitted through behaviorally modifiable forms of close contact such as sexual intercourse and the hunting and eating of bushmeat. The infectious agent is a very large, complex DNA virus that transmits poorly from person to person and is much less prone to mutation than numerous other viruses.
Once one realizes all this, it becomes frankly preposterous to attempt to justify gain-of-function research on such a pathogen for any legitimate purpose. The only plausible reason to do such research on monkeypox is to create a bioweapon – a weaponized virus – and to also create and profit from its countermeasure – a proprietary vaccine.
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