The War on Iran Is Now an Economic One

The War on Iran Is Now an Economic One

HUGH FITZGERALD

For now, the American military campaign against Iran has been put on hold. President Donald Trump has now dropped all those deadlines for the Islamic Republic of Iran to comply with American demands that he kept extending. 

Now he has chosen to rely on severe economic pressure, hoping that eventually Iran’s impoverishment will become intolerable, leading to widespread popular discontent that may again threaten the regime. The blockade of Iranian ports has led to a 90% drop in Iranian oil exports. Estimates are that the blockade is costing Iran $400 million a day in lost oil revenue. 

And Iran is no longer able to receive shipments of food and medicines from its traditional suppliers abroad, who are now blocked from using Iranian ports. How long can the Islamic Republic survive under such conditions? More on the economic war against Iran can be found here: “Trump turns time into a weapon as Iran war shifts to economic pressure phase,” by Herb Keinon, Jerusalem Post, April 24, 2026:

When US President Donald Trump extended the ceasefire with Iran this week without setting an end date, he did more than buy time. He redefined what this phase of the conflict is about.

The instinctive reading of a ceasefire is that it signals de-escalation – a step away from confrontation. That Trump backed down. Got weak knees. Capitulated, as support for the war in the US continues to tank.

But that would be a misreading of the situation. The bombing may have paused, but the pressure on the Islamic Republic has not. It has merely changed form.

A more accurate way to understand the current moment is this: the war has not stopped; it has shifted.

For six weeks, the emphasis was on military force – US and Israeli strikes designed to degrade Iran’s military infrastructure and nuclear capabilities. That objective, by most accounts, was largely achieved. Iran’s military and nuclear capabilities are not today what they were before February 28. Not by a long shot.

Smoke and flames rise from the South Pars gas field following an Israeli strike, as seen through the window of a moving vehicle, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Asaluyeh, Bushehr Province, Iran, March 18, 2026, in this screen grab obtained from social media video.

But military action alone – at least since World War II – has rarely produced durable political outcomes. It can weaken, deter, and change the situation on the ground, but it does not, by itself, reliably produce the desired political results. The US experiences in Vietnam and Iraq are glaring examples of this.

What Washington is now attempting is something different: to turn those battlefield gains into leverage – and to do so not through continued bombing, but through sustained economic pressure….

For the US and Israel, this period allows for replenishment, repositioning, rest for pilots and air crews, and the quiet preparation of next steps should the current approach fail. The US is already moving a third aircraft carrier strike force into position.

In other words, it is not simply Iran that can take advantage of this time….

During a ceasefire, it’s not only Iran that can use the time to regroup and reposition its forces, and to bring out weapons it had not used before. So can the U.S. and Israel, replenishing their diminished stock of weapons, including drones and ammunition, adding new ships to enforce the blockade on Iranian ports, and giving their pilots and air crews a much-needed rest after the furious pace of their last bombing campaign, when they, hit 15,000 sites all over Iran.

But this, too, will not be simple. As Ben-Yishai pointed out, there are currently multiple centers of power in Iran: the hardline Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps; the more pragmatic political echelon made up of the president, parliament speaker, and foreign minister; and Mojtaba Khamenei, the figure tabbed as supreme leader, but whose whereabouts and ability to function remain unknown.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is now believed to be in the ascendant in Tehran. It has taken over direction of the country; Mojtaba Khamenei is apparently physically and mentally incapable of assuming the responsibilities of rule. The “moderates” — President Pezeshkian, Parliamentary Speaker Ghalibaf, and Foreign Minister Araghchi — are all being sidelined by IRGC hardliners; Ghalibaf is already believed to have quit the negotiating team because the IRGC wanted him out.

As Trump puts it, when one weighs the hardship of higher prices at the pump against the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran, there is in his view only one choice: Americans must endure what he believes is a painful but temporary price rise, in order to save the world from a nuclear Iran.

Iran is now facing a complete economic collapse. Every day that the blockade continues costs the country $400 million. Americans have to pay more for gasoline, but what a small price that is to pay in order to prevent one of the world’s worst regimes from obtaining the world’s most dangerous weapon.

Things To Come: 'Digital Public Infrastructure'

Digital IDs are a linchpin for totalitarian control

Rhoda Wilson

For those who still have not understood that digital IDs are a cornerstone for global totalitarian control, here are some remarks from the horse’s mouth.

In the following, Tim Hinchcliffe highlights remarks made by WEF devotees relating to digital IDs being “useful” for CBDCs, access to services and information, and determining whether you have been vaccinated.

Queen Maxima of the Netherlands tells the World Economic Forum (“WEF”) in Davos that digital ID is good for knowing “who actually got a vaccination or not” and for financial inclusion.

On Thursday [15 January 2026], the Dutch queen continued her crusade to see universal adoption of digital ID because she believes it is good for everything from opening a bank account to enrolling in school and for providing proof of vaccination, aka “vaccine passports.”

Speaking at the WEF annual meeting panel entitled ‘Comparing Notes on Financial Inclusion’, Her Majesty said:

“In order to open up an account, you need to have an ID. I have to say that when I started this job, there were actually very little countries in Africa or Latin America that had one ubiquitous type of ID, and certainly that was digital and certainly that was biometric.

“We’ve really worked with all our partners to actually help grow this, and the interesting part of it is that yes, it is very necessary for financial services, but not only.”

The Dutch queen also highlighted that for the past 10 years, she had been working on developing Digital Public Infrastructure (“DPI”), which is a digital stack consisting of digital ID, digital payment systems like Central Bank Digital Currencies (“CBDCs”), and massive data sharing.

“We’ve been working in the last 10 years on a notion that we call Digital Public Infrastructure. In our experiences in different countries, to actually have these sort of things that are actually very important,” the queen told the WEF panel.

“One of these is IDs, e-signature, digital ID, so that’s extremely important, even having a QR code legislation is very important,” she added.

Last November, the United Nations and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation launched their 50-in-5 campaign to get 50 countries to roll out at least one DPI component within the next five years.

“Digital public infrastructure (DPI) – which refers to a secure and interoperable network of components that include digital payments, ID, and data exchange systems – is essential for participation in markets and society in a digital era.“—50-in-5 Campaign

As the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Advocate for Inclusive Finance for Development, Queen Maxima has been pushing the digital ID agenda for a number of years.

Vaccine passports, by their very nature, serve as a form of digital identity, according to the WEF.

And the WEF envisions digital identity being linked to everything from financial services and healthcare records to travel, mobility and digital governance.

A WEF report on ‘Reimagining Digital ID’ published in June 2023, says:

• “Digital ID may weaken democracy and civil society.”
• “The greatest risks arising from digital ID are exclusion, marginalisation and oppression.”
• Requiring any form of ID risks exacerbating fundamental social, political and economic challenges as conditional access of any kind always creates the possibility of discrimination and exclusion.”

“This digital identity determines what products, services and information we can access – or, conversely, what is closed off to us.”—Digital Identity Insight Report, WEF, 2018

Queen Maxima is also a staunch advocate for Central Bank Digital Currencies (“CBDCs”), which cannot operate without a digital ID.

According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Annual Economic Report 2021:

“The most promising way of providing central bank money in the digital age is an account-based CBDC built on digital ID with official sector involvement.”

“Identification at some level is hence central in the design of CBDCs. This calls for a CBDC that is account-based and ultimately tied to a digital identity“—Bank for International Settlements Annual Economic Report 2021

At this very moment, governments and central banks all over the world are exploring how to implement Central Bank Digital Currencies that are inextricably linked with pegging every citizen to a digital identity.

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PM instructs IDF to strike Hezbollah targets ‘with force’ after repeated truce violations

PM instructs IDF to strike Hezbollah targets ‘with force’ after repeated truce violations

Emanuel Fabian

ToI Staff

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu instructed the IDF to go after Hezbollah targets “with force” on Saturday, as the terror group and the Israeli military continued to trade fire in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, despite the extension of the tenuous ceasefire between the warring sides by several more weeks.

The premier’s order to “strike Hezbollah targets in Lebanon by force” was published in a terse statement by his office after two rockets and a drone were launched from Lebanon at northern Israel on Saturday afternoon, activating sirens in several towns.

The Israel Defense Forces said it intercepted the drone and one of the rockets, while a second rocket struck an open area. No injuries were caused.

The military also said it intercepted a “suspicious aerial target” over an area of southern Lebanon where Israeli troops are deployed. It said the target was suspected to be a Hezbollah drone.

In another incident, Hezbollah launched several explosive-laden drones at Israeli troops stationed in southern Lebanon. The IDF said the drones exploded near the forces, but did not cause any injuries.

The terror group has made use of small first-person view (FPV) drones in its attacks on Israeli troops. Some of the drones are guided using a spool of fiber optic cable, which mitigates efforts to electronically jam their signal.

“The Hezbollah terror organization has again blatantly violated the ceasefire agreement,” the military said in a statement.

At the same time, the IDF said it struck and killed several Hezbollah operatives in southern Lebanon.

In one incident, the military said it struck and killed “three Hezbollah terrorists who were traveling in a pickup truck armed with weapons.” The strike took place in Yohmor, just north of the Israeli-held security zone.

In another case, in the security zone, the military said it struck and killed a “terrorist riding a motorcycle.” Two more Hezbollah armed operatives, who were identified by troops in the security zone, were killed in an airstrike, the military said.

The IDF said all the operatives “posed a threat to IDF troops operating in southern Lebanon.”

Additionally, the IDF said it struck several buildings used by Hezbollah, including the terror group’s elite Radwan Force, in the southern Lebanon security zone. The buildings were used by Hezbollah for storing weapons and carrying out attacks, the IDF said.

“The buildings were struck to remove a threat to IDF soldiers and Israeli civilians,” the military said in a statement.

Lebanon’s health ministry said Israeli strikes in the south had killed four people.

The Israeli Air Force also struck Hezbollah rocket launchers in southern Lebanon overnight, the military said. The launchers were struck in the towns of Deir ez-Zahrani, Kfar Reman, and Sammaaiyeh, all north of the IDF-held security zone. The military said the launchers “posed a real threat to IDF troops and Israeli civilians.”

The incidents came despite an ongoing ceasefire in Lebanon, which US President Donald Trump said Thursday night would be extended by three weeks, while noting that Israel could carry out strikes in Lebanon in self-defense.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Friday accused Hezbollah of trying to sabotage the truce.

“We have begun a process to achieve a historic peace between Israel and Lebanon, and it is clear to us that Hezbollah is trying to sabotage this,” he said in a statement. “We are maintaining full freedom of action against any threat, including emerging threats. We struck yesterday, and we struck today. We are determined to restore security to the residents of the north.”

The negotiations are the first direct, sustained contact in decades between Israel and its northern neighbor, which have technically been at war since 1948, when Israel was established.

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FBI PROBES THEFT OF 15 AGRICULTURAL SPRAY DRONES IN NEW JERSEY AS IRAN WAR HEIGHTENS BIOTERROR FEARS

FBI PROBES THEFT OF 15 AGRICULTURAL SPRAY DRONES IN NEW JERSEY AS IRAN WAR HEIGHTENS BIOTERROR FEARS

Haye Kesteloo

Fifteen agricultural spray drones were stolen from a New Jersey location last month in what the FBI is treating as a sophisticated, possibly coordinated theft, according to reporting by national security journalists Jack Murphy and Sean D. Naylor at The High Side. The case is unsolved. Retired FBI agent Steve Lazarus told the outlet the bureau is “freaked out for a good reason,” warning that the machines are “industrial sprayers designed to carry and disperse significant amounts of liquid quickly and with precision.”

Agricultural drones are built to do one thing at industrial scale: move liquid onto a target along a programmed GPS path. That is exactly the feature set counterterrorism officials have worried about since the post-9/11 era, when the concern was crop-duster aircraft and a single pilot. The 2026 version of the threat model involves a fleet of remotely piloted vehicles that anyone with a Part 137 waiver, or a pirated copy of one, can fly from a parking lot.

The timing sharpens the concern. The theft occurred during the active U.S.-Israeli military campaign against Iran, a conflict now in a fragile ceasefire that President Trump extended on April 21 to allow further Pakistani-mediated negotiations. Iranian clerics have publicly called for jihad in retaliation for the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and the FBI has been on elevated alert for homeland attacks tied to the war.

Industrial agricultural drones are engineered for a task that maps almost perfectly onto a chemical or biological dispersal mission: haul a large liquid payload across a defined area along a precise GPS flight path, at low altitude, with minimal operator involvement. That is what makes them valuable on a farm and terrifying to the FBI. DJI’s Agras T50, the current flagship in a product line that dominates roughly 80 percent of the U.S. agricultural spray market, carries a 40-liter tank, lifts a 40-kilogram liquid payload, and covers about a 36-foot swath along terrain-following waypoints. A Ceres Air C31, the American-built platform pictured in The High Side’s report, carries a 31-gallon tank expandable to 40 gallons and can lift nearly 400 pounds. Fifteen of these machines operating in formation could blanket dozens of acres in a single coordinated run.

Lazarus’s description to The High Side, that a typical agricultural drone can “cover a large area in minutes, following GPS-guided paths,” matches the real-world workflow of every major Agras, XAG, and Hylio operator in the country. That is the entire point of the aircraft in farming. It also describes, almost exactly, what a bioterror dispersal platform would need to do.

The Theft Pattern Does Not Look Like Ordinary Crime

Commercial agricultural operators lose drones to theft occasionally, usually one or two units pulled from a barn or a trailer. Fifteen at once is an order of magnitude different. Spray drones of this class weigh between 90 and 170 pounds each with batteries. Moving fifteen requires a truck, a lift, advance reconnaissance of where the aircraft are stored, and a plan for what happens after. That is not a smash-and-grab for resale on Facebook Marketplace.

The FBI has not publicly named the victim operator, the specific make and model of the stolen drones, or the municipality in New Jersey where the theft occurred. That kind of information discipline suggests an active investigation with leads the bureau does not want to compromise, not a generic property crime being quietly worked at the county level.

The FCC Drone Ban Makes Replacement Nearly Impossible

Whoever lost those 15 aircraft is now caught in a regulatory trap DroneXL has been tracking for a year. On December 22, 2025, the FCC added all foreign-made drones and UAS critical components to its Covered List, blocking new equipment authorizations for DJI, Autel, XAG, and any platform built outside the United States. DJI controls roughly 80 percent of the U.S. agricultural spray drone market. If the stolen aircraft were Agras units, the victim cannot simply order replacements.

The Texas Farm Bureau warned in January that “limited availability of drones and parts could prevent farmers and ranchers from adequately managing pesticide and fertilizer use.” American-made alternatives from Hylio and Ceres Air exist but cost three to five times more than the Chinese hardware they replace, and production volume remains limited. A theft of this scale now carries a secondary cost that did not exist two years ago: the victim may not be able to rebuild the fleet at all.

The Counterterrorism Playbook Already Assumes This

Federal law enforcement has been treating weaponized consumer and commercial drones as a credible homeland threat for at least two years. In May 2025, the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force arrested a man who flew a drone over the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command facility at the Detroit Arsenal to gather targeting intelligence for a planned ISIS attack. Palm Beach County Sheriff Ric Bradshaw said publicly in January 2025 that “the next point of attack will probably be the drones.”

The operational reality is even starker across the southern border. A University of Nebraska at Omaha research center documented 221 weaponized drone incidents in Mexico between 2021 and 2025, with 27 resulting in fatalities and 77 people killed. Cartel operators are already using modified commercial drones as weapons in conditions that mirror what a domestic attacker would face. The knowledge base and the hardware both exist.

DroneXL’s Take

I’ve been covering agricultural drones for almost a decade, and every time I watch an Agras T40 or T50 fly a field pattern, the same uncomfortable thought surfaces: this aircraft is optimized for exactly the kind of mission that keeps counterterrorism officials awake. The industry has always known it. So has the FBI. The question was when, not whether, someone would try to steal a fleet of them.

Here is what sets this case apart from the usual drone-terror speculation DroneXL has pushed back on for years. Most drone threat stories involve a hypothetical attacker who buys one DJI Mini at Best Buy and straps something to it. Those scenarios are mostly noise. Fifteen industrial spray drones lifted in a coordinated operation is not noise. That is capacity, and it exists in the wrong hands right now, somewhere in the continental United States, with no public answer from the bureau about where.

Two predictions with timeframes. Within 60 days, the FBI will issue a joint bulletin to the agricultural drone industry, pesticide applicator associations, and Part 137 operators urging hardened storage requirements and immediate theft reporting. Within six months, at least one member of Congress will use this case to argue for mandatory registration and serial-number tracking of any drone with a payload capacity above 20 pounds. Whether those measures actually reduce the threat is a separate question. The political response will happen regardless.

The larger lesson for the industry is that the FCC’s rushed foreign drone ban just collided with a homeland security crisis in a way no one planned for. Farms that relied on Agras fleets for legitimate work now have a harder time rebuilding after a theft than the thieves have using the stolen equipment. That is the definition of policy working backwards.

Hamas Adopts Iran-Style Planning - Buying Time While Preparing For War

Hamas Adopts Iran-Style Planning - Buying Time While Preparing For War

YONI BEN MENACHEM/

The current situation in Gaza illustrates Hamas's dual strategy: steadfast pursuit of its political demands and continued military buildup, aimed at strengthening its power while waiting for regional developments.

Senior security officials say Hamas is waiting for changes in the region, especially related to Iran. During this time, the group aims to recover economically and rebuild its military strength.

These assessments build on earlier analysis and indicate that Hamas is preparing for the next military confrontation with Israel. Hamas assumes that refusing to disarm could eventually prompt a U.S. "green light" for Israel to forcibly seize the Gaza territory it now controls, estimated at nearly 50% of the Strip.

Against this backdrop, Hamas is expected to prolong negotiations with the "Peace Council." It is adopting an Iranian-style approach, buying time and setting preconditions to undermine U.S. President Donald Trump's 20-point plan.

Despite growing pressure, Hamas refuses to disarm, viewing its weapons as essential for survival and political standing. This position is reflected in its rejection of the Peace Council's plan, which included disarmament as a prerequisite for progress in reconstruction and for Israeli withdrawal. The council's High Commissioner, Nikolay Mladenov, said disarmament is the only way forward. Hamas and other armed groups in Gaza strongly rejected the proposal.

At the same time, Hamas continues to set clear conditions for any future arrangement, foremost among them a full withdrawal of IDF forces from all areas of the Strip, particularly those defined as the "yellow line." From Hamas's perspective, any continued Israeli presence constitutes a violation of Palestinian sovereignty and a direct threat to its ability to rebuild its strength. Hamas leaders told mediators they will not consider disarmament unless they get clear guarantees of a complete Israeli withdrawal.

A Hamas delegation led by Khalil al-Hayya visited Cairo and finished on April 3, 2026. They met with senior Egyptian officials and representatives of Palestinian factions. Hamas-affiliated media say the delegation made several demands and suggested changes. These include ending what it calls "Israeli violations," fully enforcing the ceasefire, and clarifying the expansion of Israeli-controlled areas. Amid these ongoing developments, the confrontation with Iran, along with disputes over the operation of a new technocratic committee tasked with governing Gaza, is delaying the implementation of the second phase of the ceasefire agreement. Under this phase, Hamas is expected to relinquish control and disarm.

Despite the stalemate, mediators continue efforts to persuade Hamas to demilitarize, but the organization remains firm and is closely watching regional developments. Hamas uses the situation to tighten its control, security sources say. Its forces act forcefully against critics, suspected collaborators, and militias supported by Israel. Confidence grows, seen in the presence of its armed forces on the streets. At the same time, Hamas strengthens civilian rule by expanding police, monitoring markets, keeping ministries active, and giving out aid.

Israeli security officials say Hamas is using humanitarian aid to get more money and increase control. The group reportedly takes aid, sells it in local markets, and uses the money to recruit new members or upgrade its weapons. Hamas continues to build its military, trying to smuggle in weapons, sometimes via Egypt. It is also developing its own weapons, recruiting, and training new fighters faster. The group is also repairing damaged infrastructure.

Alongside these recovery and buildup efforts, it is important to note that Hamas has not abandoned armed resistance.

Hamas carries out attacks against the Israel Defense Forces. These include using explosives, anti-tank fire and guerrilla warfare. The goal is to wear down Israeli forces and maintain a fighting image. Meanwhile, IDF forces act in "yellow line" areas. They search for militants, destroy weapons and try to stop attacks. They also target operatives breaking the ceasefire.

Hamas also runs an information campaign. It shares stories of humanitarian distress in local and international media, even as many goods are entering the Strip.

Further reflecting regional dynamics, another indication of the organization's connection to the wider arena is the postponement of its internal leadership elections until the end of the year. This delay is due to internal disagreements, including disputes over figures associated with the pro-Iranian camp. The race for head of the political bureau pits Khaled Mashal, representing the global Muslim Brotherhood current, against Khalil al-Hayya, who is identified with Iran. This development reflects Tehran's influence on decision-making within Hamas and the organization's preference to wait for greater clarity in the regional situation.

Security officials say that as long as Israel and the United States focus on Iran and Hezbollah, Hamas will keep its hold on Gaza. This remains true despite Israeli strikes, international pressure and complaints about rising costs and failing services.

In conclusion, Hamas is pursuing a dual strategy of delay and consolidation: it is strategically waiting for developments, particularly with Iran, while simultaneously reinforcing its military capabilities and governance in Gaza. The organization aims to ensure it remains a key player, even in the event of a formal transfer of authority to a civilian body after the conflict.

Senior security officials say Israel will face major political and security problems after the war with Iran, not only in Lebanon but also in Gaza. They warn that Hamas, like Hezbollah, is complex and hard to dismantle. Disarming Hamas will be very tough, and Israel should prepare for a long struggle in Gaza, where war began on Oct. 7, 2023.