Thursday, October 29, 2026

Could Netanyahu expand the Iran war before forming a government?


The Arab world is watching: could Netanyahu expand the Iran war before forming a government?



Analysis: Israel’s inconclusive election, a Pentagon leadership shake-up and a U.S.-Iran diplomatic backchannel are raising questions across the Middle East; could Netanyahu use the caretaker period to expand the war before a new coalition takes shape?


Israel’s October 27 election has left the country with arithmetic in an unfamiliar setting. With almost all ordinary ballots counted by October 29, preliminary projections gave Benjamin Netanyahu’s bloc 53 seats, Gadi Eisenkot’s opposition bloc 48, and Arab parties 19 in the 120-seat Knesset.

No bloc can govern alone, and double-envelope ballots remain uncounted. The figures may shift, but the central question is clear: does the transition constrain Israel’s use of force, or could it create a brief period in which leaders consider decisions they might avoid once coalition bargaining begins?

The question matters because the conflict with Iran has not ended. The United States and Israel began strikes on February 28, and ceasefire efforts have not produced a durable settlement. Intermittent attacks, threats and diplomatic proposals continue to shape the confrontation.

Washington is weighing renewed military action even as Vice President JD Vance has reportedly opened a channel to senior Iranian security official Mohsen Rezaei. Israel’s caretaker period is therefore more than a domestic story. It could influence the timing and political consequences of another round of fighting.


Some regional observers see the transition as a possible window for escalation. They do not claim Netanyahu has decided to strike or that Arab governments share one assessment. Their argument is that a leader without a settled coalition may calculate political costs differently from one dependent on daily bargaining. If he believes diplomacy could leave Iran with nuclear or missile capabilities, he may see an opportunity to act before a new coalition constrains him. This remains unproven. No public evidence establishes a decision or timetable.

The escalation theory is straightforward. Netanyahu may believe he has less to lose by making a security move now than by entering talks where each partner can demand concessions. A successful operation could shift the agenda, pressure opposition parties toward an emergency government and strengthen his claim that security comes before politics. But the reverse is possible. If an operation fails, causes heavy casualties or triggers sustained attacks on Israeli cities, it could damage public confidence and make cooperation harder. A military crisis does not automatically produce unity.




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