Analysis: Defense Minister Lieberman's efforts to increase IDF's budget stem from recent developments in the Middle East, including accurate missiles with larger warheads aimed at Israel from Syria and Lebanon, Iranian entrenchment in the region, and Russian presence in Syria complicating matters.
The demand from the Ministry of Defense and Minister Avigdor Lieberman for additional budgeting is only the tip of the iceberg, the top of which pokes out on occasion in the media and in the political arena. The iceberg itself is change—for the worse—in the threat the Israeli home front faces in case war breaks out on the northern border.
While the defense establishment estimates the Iranians and their proxies, Hezbollah and Syria, can cause a far greater loss of life and material damages to the Israeli civilian and military home front than they could mere years ago, with the worst still yet to come.
While IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot and top army brass are not opposed to the move, they have thus far offered only halfhearted support for it publically. Senior army officials concur with Lieberman and the ministry's officials on the gravity of the new potential threat the Iranian axis poses to the home front. Indeed, the estimate was originally put together by the IDF's Military Intelligence Directorate and Planning Directorate. However, the top army brass believes the IDF already possesses the means and the methods to tackle the worsening northern threat head-on, and it would therefore be imprudent and unjustified to undercut the budgetary equilibrium struck by the IDF thanks to the Gideon multiyear plan, which was achieved after exhausting negotiations between the finance minister and Lieberman's predecessor Moshe Ya'alon.
Motivating the requested NIS 3.8 billion (net) increase to the defense budget are three strategic developments that came into force in the past two years, which adversely affect the country's security standing. The first development is the so-called "precision revolution," which the Iranians and their proxies attempt to inject into their munitions component. Instead of "static fire" based on a large number of missiles, rockets, artillery shells and mortars—a large portion of which will either hit low-value targets or miss their mark completely—the Iranian axis is moving on a smaller arsenal of munitions of different types, all of which are calibrated to hit high-value targets. Either direct hits or hit landing within several meters of a relatively small number of "quality targets" will inflict casualties and damages of a strategic military or functional civilian nature far, far graver than the thousands of imprecise missiles and rockets (representing "static fire") lobbed by Hezbollah at Israel during the Second Lebanon War, for instance. Simultaneously with improving the projectiles' precision using GPS and other means, Iranian military industries are also hard at work to increase their warheads and range. Adding hundreds of kilograms more of conventional explosives to a rocket or missile's warhead increases its destructive potential and number of losses it can cause with a direct hit. Increasing the range then enables to move rocket launch pads further back in Syria and Lebanon—and even Iran—to areas the Israeli Air Force will be hard pressed to attack.
These firing forces will not be many, but they will be more precise. This effectively means the IDF will have to split its main offensive effort in twain. Instead of a focused, simultaneous effort hitting all of Lebanon from the air, ground and sea to paralyze or suppress projectiles lobbed by Hezbollah at Israel, the army's command will have to send the air force and maneuvering land divisions to attack not just in Lebanon but also in Syria. Such an attack will also be waged not merely at Hezbollah—now attacking on two fronts—but also at the Syrian army and whichever forces Iran stations in Syria. All of the aforementioned forces will come together—according to Iran's strategic vision—to rain precise fire on central Tel Aviv and the Kirya army headquarters base, the Haifa oil refineries and ammonia tank, as well as many more "quality targets" on the Israeli home front. The third strategic development to hamper our ability to defend ourselves is the Russian military presence in Syria. Without going into too much detail, it may be said Russian boots on the ground limit the air force's abilities as far as neutralizing projectile launch pads in Syria and Lebanon is concerned. The air force will now have to consider Russian radars and antiaircraft batteries already stationed in Syria, as well as cutting edge antiaircraft missiles—such as the SA-22—Russia has already sold to the Syrian and Iranian armies and will assist them in operating, it may be reasonably assumed.
If Israel's enemies already possess several hundreds precise missiles and heavy rockets, it would be fair to assume there will eventually be hundreds such projectils aimed at Israel. Based on the above assumption, the number of intercepting missiles carried by the IDF's missile-defense systems must be increased, especially as it pertains to missiles carried by the David's Sling system and the Arrow 2 and 3 missiles intended to handle heavy rockets and precise ballistic missiles.