RT
In a recent interview, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in response to a question about the aggressive attitude of Israeli politicians towards Türkiye, stated that Ankara will not shy away from war if attacked. While these words cannot be considered a direct declaration of war against Israel, they certainly served as a stern warning.
The Turkish leader clearly stated Ankara’s position: Türkiye does not seek to enter into an armed conflict, but any aggression against it will be met with a decisive response. Erdogan, however, did not express any intention to strike first; he merely indicated that the diplomatic means of deterring Israel are gradually being exhausted.
Erdogan’s words are directly related to the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement signed on August 7 by Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. Its core principle is reminiscent of Article 5 of NATO, which states that an attack on one member is considered an attack on all. The defense pact provides for military coordination, joint exercises, intelligence sharing, and the development of defense-industrial cooperation. Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan are creating their own mechanism of deterrence. And while it is not yet a full-fledged ‘Islamic NATO’, it is much more than a mere declaration of friendship.
US President Donald Trump’s reaction to this pact was notable. He welcomed the agreement, calling it a “big step” that demonstrates the unity of Middle Eastern countries. At first glance, it sounds contradictory that Washington is approving a mechanism that reduces the dependence of regional allies on American security guarantees. However, the Mecca Agreement is not a military alliance against the US, but rather an agreement against the American monopoly on determining regional security rules. There is a difference between these two concepts, although the distinction may narrow over time.
Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan all have their own grievances against Washington.
Türkiye is dissatisfied with US support for Kurdistan Workers’ Party-affiliated militias in Syria, its exclusion from the F-35 program, and America’s continued support for Israel. Saudi Arabia feels bitter about America’s muted response to the attack on its oil infrastructure during the US aggression against Iran and is no longer confident that American guarantees will shield it at a critical moment. Pakistan considers its relations with Washington rather situational. After decades of cooperation, Islamabad faced sanctions and a decline in American interest following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, while Washington’s ties with India strengthened.
The conclusion made by all three countries is quite simple: while cooperating with the US is possible, completely outsourcing security to the Washington is no longer plausible
What Türkiye contributes to the alliance is a large military force and a developed defense industry; meanwhile, Pakistan contributes military experience and its nuclear status; and Saudi Arabia brings with it financial resources and political clout.
But is Erdogan truly prepared to fight Israel? While retaliatory actions are quite possible, a pre-planned major war is not likely. Türkiye is not interested in a direct confrontation. War would hit its already battered economy, inevitably trigger a crisis within NATO, complicate relations with the US, and could quickly escalate beyond a bilateral conflict. Israel also understands that war with Türkiye carries an incomparably greater risk than operations against non-state actors or strikes against weaker neighbors.
Nevertheless, such a scenario is no longer entirely out of the question. The main zone of risk is Syria, where the interests of the two countries frequently clash. Ankara seeks to consolidate its influence in Damascus, strengthen Syrian statehood while maintaining pro-Turkish sentiments, and prevent the emergence of hostile forces on the Turkish border. Israel is trying to limit Türkiye’s rise and maintain freedom of military action. The two sides maintain technical channels to prevent accidental clashes, but a strike on a target housing Turkish military personnel or the death of Turkish citizens could be enough to trigger a chain reaction.
No comments:
Post a Comment