Commentary: Israel and Iran are trading strikes on key infrastructure as Trump weighs diplomacy or military escalation; in Lebanon, Israel is building a new buffer zone, but stopping the fire on the Galilee may still require a broader ground maneuver
Since last week, a pattern and a degree of intent have begun to emerge in the launches from Iran and in the firepower Israel is bringing to bear on Iran. It could be described as an eye-for-an-eye dynamic.
The Iranians strike the Dimona area with missiles, and we strike the heavy water reactor in Arak, even though that area had already been hit. The Iranians strike and damage a petrochemical plant producing chemical fertilizers in Ramat Hovav, and overnight, we strike a petrochemical plant in Tabriz, in northwestern Iran. The next day, the Iranians launch a cluster missile at the Bazan oil refinery in Haifa. That is one trend.
A second trend, particularly in the Israeli strikes, is attacks on Iranian critical infrastructure with dual military and civilian uses. A clear example is the strike on steel plants in Iran that produce for the civilian market while also manufacturing steel used in missile production, and that are partly owned by the Revolutionary Guards.
That fact is worth noting because the Americans, at least in their official position as reflected in statements from the Pentagon and the White House, oppose Israeli strikes on Iran’s critical infrastructure. Washington is concerned that the Iranians will respond with barrages against oil facilities across the Gulf and further deepen the global energy crisis that is already beginning to take shape.
However, Jerusalem believes that unless Iran’s critical infrastructure is dealt a heavy blow, both the Revolutionary Guards and the Iranian civilian government will continue the hard-line, defiant course they are now pursuing, both in negotiations with the United States and in missile and drone launches toward Israel and the Gulf states.
In addition, striking critical infrastructure in Iran, such as oil depots, petrochemical plants and dams, would also intensify the internal debate now taking place within the Iranian establishment — between Revolutionary Guards hardliners and senior figures in the civilian government, most notably President Masoud Pezeshkian.
As for what comes next, it appears that U.S. President Donald Trump is trying to bring the fighting to an end through diplomacy, but without giving up his main goals, such as reopening the Strait of Hormuz or getting Iran’s highly enriched uranium out of the country. If that can be achieved through negotiations, all the better.
If the war does not end soon through negotiations, the Pentagon is preparing a relatively broad range of options for Trump, including special operations that would give the U.S. president the PR victory he is looking for, after which he could forgo a diplomatic agreement with the Iranians.
At this stage, we are at a point where no decision has yet been made at the White House. Any attempt to understand what Trump will ultimately decide, based on the barrage of statements he is issuing in the media, is doomed from the outset to fail, simply because Trump still has not decided which course of action he will choose.
For now, while in Iran the military plan — at least according to U.S. CENTCOM and the IDF — appears to be unfolding step by step, in Lebanon Israel is still far from achieving its war aims. There is not even the slightest sign that Hezbollah is prepared to disarm, and there is no actor inside Lebanon capable of enforcing such a move, including the Lebanese government.
Israel plans to keep “effective control” of southern Lebanon even for an indefinite period after the current war ends, presuming that Hezbollah will not yet have disarmed, defense sources said on Monday.
At the same time, multiple IDF sources have previously said that this effective control will not look the same as Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon between 1982 and 2000, when it had IDF and Southern Lebanese Army’s mostly Christian forces physically present throughout the area.
But on Monday, defense sources got more specific about what this effective control would look like and how it would be different from the prior era.
Defense sources said that there would not necessarily be a heavy IDF physical footsoldier presence all the way up to the Litani River and throughout southern Lebanon at all times.
Rather, the IDF would use various sensors, surveillance, aerial power, artillery, and tanks mixed in with ground troops in various parts of southern Lebanon in order to keep Hezbollah out, but without actually holding stagnant positions throughout the area, defense sources stated.
There is no intention at this time to build any more permanent IDF bases in southern Lebanon, although it was unclear if that would remain the case if there was an extended standoff with Hezbollah over disarmament.
In the meantime, defense sources said that Israel will prevent the mostly Hezbollah-affiliated Shiites ofsouthern Lebanon from returning to their villages.
Moreover, defense sources stated that houses on the first line of southern Lebanese villages, which were not destroyed in the fall of 2024, are now being destroyed based on the concept that Hezbollah used and abused any remaining structures in that area.
According to defense sources, 621,000 Shiites have been evacuated from southern Lebanon, and 585,000 Shiites have been evacuated from Dahiya in Beirut during the current conflict.
South of the Litani River, 71% of the Lebanese residents have been evacuated, as have 67% of the Lebanese south of the Zahrani River.
Regarding quarters within Dahiya, multiple key quarters have been nearly fully evacuated, while others are still only one or two-thirds evacuated.
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