Analysis: With Hamas reduced to about 8,000 terrorists and struggling to rebuild its military and governing capabilities, the IDF sees multiple ways to contain the group, but a potentially greater threat is quietly growing beneath the surface in Gaza
I had not been in Gaza in recent months, and what surprised me was what I saw in the area controlled by the IDF. The outpost bustling with activity below us did not resemble any IDF defensive complex I had known in the past, not during the War of Attrition along the Suez Canal and in the Jordan Valley in the 1970s, nor in the security zone in Lebanon during the 1980s and 1990s.
For security reasons, details cannot be provided, but there were no massive bunkers designed to withstand heavy artillery or aerial bombardment. Instead, there were concrete structures that provide solid protection against direct fire and high-trajectory attacks. They are positioned so that troops can reach shelter within seconds and can also be moved relatively quickly if the outpost itself needs to be relocated.
More than anything, the outpost resembled the fortified compounds the Americans built in Iraq and Afghanistan to protect their forces from guerrilla attacks: a base housing a relatively large force with extensive capabilities, whose personnel can shift from routine operations to combat within minutes.
The IDF has established 40 such outposts throughout the Gaza Strip. All are intended to house combined combat teams of varying sizes, made up of armor, infantry and engineering forces. Most are complete, particularly in northern Gaza, while some are still under construction. Each outpost costs about 5 million shekels. The outposts support one another with observation and fire coverage.
The outpost I visited overlooks the ruins, and what remains of the buildings, in the village of Bani Suheila. About 600 to 700 meters south and slightly east of us, atop a high dune, another earthen-walled outpost could be seen, also positioned on terrain commanding observation and fire all the way to the sea.
The outposts are not located directly on the "Yellow Line" but several hundred meters inside territory controlled by the IDF. The goal is to prevent assaults launched directly from areas controlled by Hamas, whether above ground or through tunnels, and to reduce vulnerability to short-range direct fire.
From the observation position, it was easy to see that the "Yellow Line" in this sector runs directly along Salah al-Din Road (the "Tancher" route) in central Gaza. Once, this road connected the northern and southern parts of the Strip from end to end. Today, only scattered stretches of asphalt and broken traffic islands remain, though the route is still clearly visible by day and night. The soldiers stationed there know that anyone crossing that road must be stopped or killed.
In the area, hundreds of meters wide between the two outposts and the "Yellow Line", the IDF is establishing a buffer and security zone. A trench is currently being dug along it to prevent rapid incursions by motorcycles, pickup trucks and other vehicles into IDF-controlled territory and potentially toward communities near the Gaza border.
In addition, the IDF is conducting drilling operations in the area to expose tunnels that existed before Oct. 7 or that Hamas is digging now. The aim is to prevent surprises for forces stationed in the outposts or moving through the area.
Since the Oct. 7 massacre, the IDF has uncovered and destroyed about 450 kilometers (280 miles) of tunnels. Some were blown up and others filled with concrete. Commanders in the field say they are no longer operational along their entire length.
Hamas possesses drones and likely explosive UAVs as well, but for now it lacks the fiber-optic capabilities Hezbollah developed in Lebanon. The IDF currently enjoys near-total drone and UAV superiority over Gaza's skies.
Using high-quality military and Shin Bet intelligence, including both human and technological sources, the IDF is systematically eliminating senior commanders, key military specialists and police officials responsible for maintaining governance.
According to the IDF Spokesperson's Unit, 13 terrorists were killed in airstrikes during the past week alone, including four senior members of Hamas' General Security apparatus in Gaza and a terrorist involved in advancing attacks against forces stationed there. That terrorist infiltrated Israel on Oct. 7 and participated in the abduction of four Israelis from the roadside shelter at Re'im Junction.
Hamas members refuse to disarm and continue trying, at a minimum, to wage a guerrilla campaign. They are still manufacturing explosives, gathering intelligence and sending adults — and especially teenagers, whom the IDF refers to as "shoots" — to test when the IDF detects them, how quickly it responds and by what means.
But Hamas has been severely weakened and in recent days has initiated little beyond intelligence gathering, so as not to provoke a major Israeli response.
Another factor troubling Hamas and undermining its rule is the presence of armed clans whose members and families, numbering in the tens of thousands, live in IDF-controlled areas and continually challenge Hamas authority.
Public support for the terrorist organization appears to be declining. Evidence of this was seen at the funeral of Izz al-Din Haddad, the Gaza City commander who became Hamas' leader in Gaza after the elimination of the movement's senior leadership. Only a few dozen Gazans attended, compared with the tens of thousands who once attended funerals of commanders less senior than he was.
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