Can the US and Iran turn a ceasefire into a deal?

Can the US and Iran turn a ceasefire into a deal?

RT

The US-Iran ceasefire, which was announced last night by US President Donald Trump, brings a cautious sense of optimism and hope that the war may eventually come to an end. However, a ceasefire is not a peace agreement. The two-week pause in hostilities could unfold according to different scenarios: it could lead to meaningful negotiations and ultimately a comprehensive peace deal, or it could be terminated, and the conflict would enter a new phase. 

Moreover, we shouldn’t underestimate the fragility of such agreements. A ceasefire can be broken at any moment – within days or even hours. It’s entirely possible that Washington could abruptly change its stance; for instance, Trump might claim that Iran is acting in bad faith and use that as justification to end the ceasefire and resume military operations.

At the same time, the very structure of the ceasefire raises important questions. Reports indicate that the agreement includes a 10-point plan proposed by Iran, which the US has acknowledged as the basis for current negotiations. These talks are expected to take place in Islamabad, with Pakistan playing the role of mediator.

Both the ceasefire and America’s acceptance of Iran’s proposal as a foundation for negotiations raise many questions. If Iran has truly been “defeated” as Trump has repeatedly claimed during the 39 days of intense conflict, or if it has been “effectively destroyed” as his comments suggest, then why is Washington considering Tehran’s offers as a starting point for peace talks?

The aforementioned 10-point plan – which is said to form the basis for a potential peace agreement and which, at least rhetorically, Trump seems willing to discuss – deserves particular scrutiny. The points include commitments to non-aggression, continued Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz, acceptance of Iran’s right to enrich uranium, the lifting of primary and secondary sanctions, the termination of UN Security Council resolutions and IAEA Board of Governors’ decisions, compensation payments to Iran, the withdrawal of American troops from the region, and the cessation of hostilities on all fronts, including in Lebanon.

However, upon closer examination, it becomes clear that many of these points are highly contentious and, in some cases, nearly impossible to implement. This is especially true regarding the demand for the withdrawal of US troops from the region. It’s hard to imagine that Washington would genuinely agree to such a move under pressure from Tehran. For the US, this would not just mean a military realignment; it would essentially dismantle a significant portion of its regional influence. Geopolitically speaking, such a decision would appear as a voluntary relinquishment of US interests cultivated over several decades, and would increase Iran’s geopolitical standing both regionally and globally.

Agreeing to this point would mean that the US is effectively endorsing a significant reduction of its geopolitical influence in the Middle East. Therefore, it’s reasonable to conclude that the US will be reluctant to take such a step. Moreover, with the 250th anniversary of the adoption of the Declaration of Independence coming up, it’s unlikely that Trump (who coincidentally is also celebrating his 80th birthday this year) would want to mark this occasion with what could be seen as a geopolitical capitulation.

Of particular interest is the point regarding Iran’s continued control over the Strait of Hormuz. Here, we may find one of the key geopolitical priorities. If we were to hypothetically assume that the US agreed to such a formulation, it would signify much more than mere acknowledgment of the status quo. Essentially, it would equate to recognizing Iran’s dominance over one of the most crucial strategic nodes in global energy trade. In other words, Washington would be indirectly acknowledging Tehran’s geopolitical triumph.

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