The “deconfliction mechanism” that they’re reportedly discussing would likely be insufficient for resolving their security dilemma and might thus only delay what could be an inevitable clash.
Israel and Turkiye held talks in Azerbaijan last week on the creation of a so-called “deconfliction mechanism” for preventing an accidental conflict between them in Syria. No details were disclosed but it might resemble the one that Israel and Russia agreed upon in September 2015 and which is still in use. Unlike its precedent, however, this new one that’s reportedly in the works has much higher stakes given the escalating Israeli-Turkish rivalry in Syria since the fall of the Assad Government last December.
Israel never regarded post-Soviet Russia as a threat, and in fact, relations between them are closer than ever under Putin due to his lifelong passionate philo-Semitism. Their “deconfliction mechanism” therefore wasn’t all that difficult to negotiate and maintain since Russia had no ideological or strategic reason to interfere with Israel’s regular bombing of the IRGC and Hezbollah in Syria. Israeli-Russian relations sharply contrast with Israeli-Turkish ones, however, in the ways that’ll now be explained.
Israel and Turkiye’s mutual threat perceptions worsened after October 7th. Turkiye believes that Israel’s military operation in Gaza is a genocide that could one day be replicated against Muslims everywhere and can only be averted by restoring a regional balance of power. Israel suspects that Turkiye might try to achieve the aforesaid by ordering its Syrian clients to host ideologically aligned Hamas militants who’d be defended from Israeli airstrikes by Turkish air defense systems (even if they’re only Syrian-manned).
Turkiye abuts Syria so it can bolster its new authorities’ military capabilities and those of their shared Hamas allies much easier and quicker than Iran was able to bolster the Assad Government’s and their shared “Resistance Axis” allies’. This represents a much greater national security threat than the one that Israel earlier mitigated via its “deconfliction” mechanism with Russia, not least because Turkish systems might be used to defend Hamas, while Russian ones were never used to defend the “Resistance Axis”.
The potential downing of an Israeli jet by Turkish air defense systems (even if they’re only Syrian-manned) during an anti-Hamas bombing mission in the Arab Republic could spark a regional crisis that they want to avoid for now. Neither can be sure whether the US would take their side against the other, both over that hypothetical incident and whatever they choose to do afterwards, and the worst-case scenario of a direct Israeli-Turkish clash – let alone a conventional war – is fraught with uncertainties.
At the same time, such a scenario could become more likely if the newly exacerbated Israeli-Turkish security dilemma in Syria isn’t responsibly managed, but the root cause is arguably more connected to regional leadership aspirations than it is to Hamas. Israel and Turkiye are vying to fill the void left by the unexpected expulsion of Iran’s on-the-ground influence in Syria, which both envisage achieving via a hybrid approach, but their methods differ.
Israel wants to retain its freedom to bomb whoever it wants there together with strengthening the Druze and Kurds in order to facilitate the creation of a decentralized Syria that could be more easily divided-and-ruled for thwarting latent threats. Turkiye wants military bases and Hamas militants in a centralized Syria, which are tangible returns on its 14-year-long investment into regime change there, and to symbolically lead the Ummah by positioning its forces to strike Israel from Syria (even if it never does).
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