* 25 May 2023: “NATO Might Consider Belarus To Be ‘Low-Hanging Fruit’ During Kiev’s Upcoming Counteroffensive”
* 1 June 2023: “The Union State Expects That The NATO-Russian Proxy War Will Expand”
* 14 June 2023: “Lukashenko Strongly Hinted That He Expects Belgorod-Like Proxy Incursions Against Belarus”
* 14 December 2023: “Belarus Is Bracing For Belgorod-Like Terrorist Incursions From Poland”
* 19 February 2024: “The Western-Backed Foreign-Based Belarusian Opposition Is Plotting Territorial Revisions”
* 21 February 2024: “Is The West Plotting A False Flag Provocation In Poland To Blame On Russia & Belarus?”
* 26 April 2024: “Analyzing Belarus’ Claim Of Recently Thwarting Drone Attacks From Lithuania”
* 30 June 2024: “Keep An Eye On Ukraine’s Military Buildup Along The Belarusian Border”
* 12 August 2024: “What’s Behind Belarus’ Military Buildup Along The Ukrainian Border?”
* 13 August 2024: “Security Threats To Belarus”
* 19 August 2024: “Ukraine Reportedly Has A Whopping 120,000 Troops Deployed Along Its Border With Belarus”
* 26 August 2024: “Ukraine Might Be Gearing Up To Attack Or Cut Off Belarus’ Southeastern City Of Gomel”
* 28 September 2024: “Belarus’ Warning About Using Nukes Probably Isn’t A Bluff (But There Might Be A Catch)”
This summer’s Ukrainian invasion of Russia’s Kursk Region might also have emboldened the plotters.
No nuclear retaliation from Russia followed despite the threat that this NATO-backed attack posed to its territorial integrity. Likewise, they might calculate that neither Russia nor Belarus (which hosts the former’s tactical nukes) would resort to these means if they replicated that scenario in the latter, especially if the invasion also came from Ukraine instead of NATO countries like Poland. This could give the West more leverage in upcoming peace talks with Russia if it succeeds.
Taken together, the latest developments indicate that Russia’s response to an unconventional mercenary invasion of Belarus and/or a conventional Ukrainian one might be different than its response to Kursk, and this could serve as the tripwire for the Cuban-like brinksmanship crisis that’s been brewing.
Russia cannot afford to have its adversaries capture and hold Belarusian territory because of the national security threat that this presents and also because it would greatly undermine its negotiating position.
It might very well be that the West is aware of this and thus hopes to provoke precisely such a response from Russia with the expectation that “escalating to de-escalate” can end the conflict on better terms for their side. That would be a huge gamble since the stakes are much higher for Russia than for the West, thus reducing the chances that the former would agree to the concessions that the latter might demand, such as freezing the conflict along the existing Line of Contact without anything else in exchange.
That would also be a huge gamble though since crossing the nuclear threshold might tremendously raise the stakes for the West as its leaders sincerely see it even if the primary intent is only to punish Ukraine. Nevertheless, seeing as how Putin is now finally climbing the escalation ladder and throwing some of his previous caution to the wind after feeling like his prior patience was mistaken by the West as weakness, he might be influenced by hawkish advisors into seeing that as an opportunity to flex Russia’s muscles.
In any case, regardless of whatever might happen, the fact is that it’s the West’s prerogative whether or not Belarus is destabilized and possibly also invaded. Ukraine could also “go rogue” out of desperation if it feels that the West might “sell it out” under Trump and thus wants to make a last-ditch attempt to improve its negotiating position or “escalate to de-escalate” on better terms for itself, but this could greatly backfire if it fails. They both therefore bear full responsibility for what could follow.
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