Key points
- Putin's latest speech was designed to send message - and prevent the thing he's 'scared' of | Diana Magnay analysis View post
- Lukashenko orders Belarusian army to be at 'full combat readiness' View post
- Prigozhin says he wasn't trying to overthrow Putin; explains why he withdrew; and boasts he could have taken Ukraine in 'one day' View post
- Your questions answered: How likely is it that Prigozhin could lead a Russian advance from Belarus? View post
- Live reporting by Jess Sharp and Ollie Cooper
Your questions answered: Why didn't Russian troops engage Wagner troops earlier?
Our military experts and senior correspondents have been answering your questions on the Ukraine war.
Today's question comes from Measle77, who asks: If Russia seriously thought the Wagner group was going to attack them, why didn't they fire at them before they got so close to the border? Why did they wait to see how close Wagner got?
Military expert Sean Bell has given his answer below...
The seismic events in Russia this past weekend raise more questions than answers, and although more details will inevitably emerge in the coming days, the paucity of information has prompted a raft of speculation – much of which is ill-informed.
The boss of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, is an old friend of President Vladimir Putin - they have a mutually beneficial business relationship - and Russia has become increasingly dependent on mercenary support to deliver battlefield success for its illegal invasion of Ukraine. But, Mr Putin also likes to maintain a degree of anarchy within his leadership team to ensure that no individual can become too powerful and risk challenging Mr Putin himself.
As a result, the ongoing feud between Prigozhin and the regular Russian army leadership of defence secretary Sergei Shoigu and General Gerasimov was tolerated and perhaps even exploited by Mr Putin. But, Mr Putin would have been concerned that Prigozhin's frustrations were extending beyond the Russian MoD and risked undermining his own authority, which explains why Mr Putin supported all "volunteers" (mercenaries) being obliged to sign on to the regular MoD by 1 July.
Although Mr Putin has relied heavily on mercenary groups for the past decade, he probably felt he had no choice but to "tame the monster" [Prigozhin] that he had created. However, notwithstanding the impact on the Wagner Group (and others), he would probably never have expected his old friend Prigozhin to attempt a coup.
Events unfolded apace at the weekend, and it is likely that Mr Putin had little more notice than the media about Prigozhin's "march for justice". Apparently, Mr Putin refused to take any calls from Prigozhin during the convoy – probably because of the grave risks that any uprising might involve – but Mr Putin did direct his military to take decisive measures to stop Prigozhin.
These steps included digging up roads to act as obstacles, setting up armed roadblocks, and although time was at a premium, Mr Putin also directed armed Russian helicopter gunships to strafe the Prigozhin convoy, killing a number of Wagner personnel. Reports suggest this fire was reciprocated, and seven Russian helicopters and a larger plane were shot down, killing at least 13 Russian aviators.
Apparently, throughout the advance, Prigozhin was taking a series of calls from President Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus which eventually led to Prigozhin turning back the convoy, albeit we might never know what prompted that change of heart.
In sum, although we do not know the details of what happened, it appears very likely that Mr Putin did not expect Wagner forces to attack Russia. It is also entirely feasible that Prigozhin also did not want to attack Russia, but did want to expose what he considered to be the ineptitude of the Russian military leadership. However, once on the road to Moscow, Prigozhin left Mr Putin no choice but to act swiftly and decisively, and a crisis was averted.
For now.
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