Monday, February 23, 2026

Israel's New Threat: The Turkish Noose Replacing The Iranian Crescent


Israel's New Threat: The Turkish Noose Replacing The Iranian Crescent
 PIERRE REHOV/GATESTONE INSTITUTE



While much of the world's attention remains fixed on Iran and its Shi'ite axis, another geopolitical realignment is taking shape -- more quietly, more pragmatically, and potentially just as consequential for the US, Israel and the Middle East.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has launched an ambitious diplomatic offensive aimed at unifying the Sunni world under Ankara's leadership. The objective is not merely reconciliation with former rivals. It is the construction of a Sunni diplomatic and strategic "wall," or "noose," around Israel, replacing the Iranian "Shi'ite crescent" with a new configuration of Sunni power.

In early February 2026, Erdogan embarked on a Middle East tour that signaled a turning point. On February 3, he visited Saudi Arabia. On February 4, Egypt. On February 7, Jordan's King Abdullah II was received in Istanbul. These meetings were not symbolic. They marked the culmination of a "normalization" process that has been unfolding since 2022, as Turkey repaired relations that were damaged by its earlier ideological support for the Muslim Brotherhood and confrontations with Gulf monarchies.

The Turkish-Saudi reconciliation is particularly significant. Following years of tension after the 2018 murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul, Ankara and Riyadh have now moved decisively toward strategic cooperation. Discussions with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman produced major agreements, including a $2 billion Saudi investment in renewable energy projects in Turkey, targeting 5,000 megawatts of solar capacity. Defense cooperation was expanded to include technology transfers for Turkish drones and air defense systems. Bilateral trade is expected to reach $50 billion.

Erdogan has emphasized "growing strategic trust" in confronting regional instability -- from Syria to Gaza. Turkish and Saudi officials increasingly frame Israel as a destabilizing actor in these theaters. The emerging partnership is not merely economic; it reflects coordinated positioning against perceived external threats, with Israel explicitly cited.

Egypt represents an even more dramatic shift. After a decade of hostility -- triggered by Turkey's support for the Muslim Brotherhood following the 2013 ouster of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi -- Erdogan's visit to Cairo marked the end of a long freeze. Turkey and Egypt have now signed a $350 million military framework agreement covering joint weapons production, intelligence sharing, and military exercises. Turkish air defense systems and munitions are slated for delivery, and bilateral trade is projected to reach $15 billion.

Strategically, Egypt's participation transforms the coalition's scope. As the guardian of the Suez Canal and a dominant actor in North Africa, Egypt provides logistical leverage capable of influencing maritime routes critical to Israel's economy. Discussions between Erdogan and President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi reportedly included Gaza, Syria, and Africa--regions where both countries share concerns over the influence of Israel and the United Arab Emirates.

Jordan, long a security partner of Israel despite persistent political hostility at home, has also been drawn into closer alignment with Turkey. Joint statements have emphasized peace in Syria and Gaza and highlighted "common concerns" about regional stability. A future Erdogan visit to Amman is under discussion, underscoring Jordan's integration into Ankara's growing network.

On February 9, 2026, the foreign ministers of Turkey, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates issued a joint communiqué condemning what they called "Israeli expansionist policies in occupied territories" and calling for Islamic unity. Israeli media outlets such as Ynet interpreted the statement as evidence of a "coalition of interests against Israel," with Turkey playing the unifying role.

Some analysts describe an emerging "Sunni axis," or noose, influenced by Muslim Brotherhood ideology; backed by Turkish military power, financed by Qatar and Saudi Arabia, and designed, by expanding into Gaza, to encircle and finish off Israel. The isolated Turkish-Qatari alignment of 2017-2021 appears to have evolved into a broader strategy of economic and diplomatic influence, channeling of neo-Ottoman ambitions.

In Libya, once divided between Turkish-backed Tripoli and Egyptian-supported Marshal Khalifa Haftar, Ankara and Cairo are now aligning to stabilize the country and limit UAE-supported militias perceived as close to Israel. In Sudan, near Egypt's southwestern border, the Sudanese civil war continues. Turkey provides logistical and intelligence support, aligning with Saudi Arabia to potentially threaten Israeli access to the Red Sea.

In Somalia, Egypt has increased its military presence to approximately 10,000 troops after Israel's December 2025 recognition of Somaliland. Turkey maintains its largest overseas military base in Mogadishu, training Somali forces and developing military infrastructure. A Saudi-Somali defense agreement strengthens this axis, positioning it near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait -- a chokepoint vital to global trade and Israeli shipping. The stated objective is securing the Red Sea against "foreign military presence." The unstated implication is the containment of Israel.

This evolving configuration represents a transformation of what was once considered the "moderate Sunni camp" -- historically aligned with the United States and tolerant, if not friendly, toward Israel -- into a broader Islamic coalition capable of exerting diplomatic, economic and military pressure. Israeli analysts increasingly describe it as the replacement of Iran's Shiite axis with a Sunni bloc influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood.






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