A new report from the Heritage Foundation analyzing a potential conflict between the United States and China was so precise—and so unsettling—that the Trump administration requested portions of it be redacted before public release, even though the analysis relied entirely on publicly available information. The report underscores not only the growing role of artificial intelligence (AI) in modern war planning but also the sobering reality that the U.S. military faces structural weaknesses that could prove decisive in a high-intensity conflict with Beijing.
The report, titled “TIDALWAVE: Strategic Exploitation and Sustainment in a U.S.–China Conflict,” uses an AI-enabled model to simulate thousands of iterations of a U.S.–China war over Taiwan. Unlike traditional tabletop exercises, TIDALWAVE tracks how losses in aircraft, ships, fuel, and precision munitions compound over time, revealing how quickly modern warfare can drive even a powerful nation to the breaking point.
According to the report, “existing programs of record do not adequately address shortfalls in the resources required to combat the PRC effectively, despite the increasing risk of confrontation.” That conclusion, grounded in open-source data rather than classified intelligence, forms the backbone of TIDALWAVE’s warning to Congress and defense planners.
The AI model drew on more than 7,000 open-source government, academic, industry, and commercial data points to assess both U.S. and Chinese vulnerabilities. Its findings are stark. In most high-intensity scenarios, the first 30 to 60 days of conflict determine the war’s long-term outcome. Early losses in aircraft, ships, fuel throughput, and munitions rapidly compound and cannot be recovered on operationally relevant timelines.
TIDALWAVE finds that the United States would culminate (reach the point at which it can no longer sustain operations) far sooner than China. In some scenarios, up to 90 percent of U.S. and allied aircraft positioned at major forward bases in Japan and Guam are destroyed on the ground during the opening phase of the conflict, as Chinese missile strikes simultaneously hit runways, fuel depots, command facilities, and parked aircraft. The implication is straightforward: hardening, dispersal, and missile defense are not “nice-to-haves.” They are prerequisites for operational survival.
Precision-guided munitions emerge as another critical vulnerability. Long-range anti-ship missiles, air-to-air interceptors, and missile defense systems begin to run short within five to seven days of major combat operations. Across most scenarios, those munitions are exhausted within roughly 35 to 40 days, leaving U.S. forces unable to sustain high-tempo combat.
Fuel, however, is the most decisive factor of all. The report makes a crucial distinction: in most possible scenarios, the United States does not typically run out of fuel—it loses the ability to move fuel under fire. Chinese doctrine explicitly prioritizes attacks on tankers, ports, pipelines, and replenishment vessels. Even limited disruptions are sufficient to drive fuel throughput below survivable levels, forcing U.S. commanders to sharply curtail air and naval operations despite fuel remaining in aggregate stockpiles.
By contrast, the report assesses that China is capable of sustaining high-intensity combat for months longer under the modeled assumptions. Although Chinese ammunition stockpiles begin to decline after roughly 20 to 30 days, substitution effects and industrial resilience extend Beijing’s ability to fight well beyond the point at which U.S. forces culminate.
The implications extend far beyond the battlefield. TIDALWAVE concludes that once a Taiwan conflict begins, the United States is highly unlikely to prevent massive global economic fallout. Disrupted shipping lanes, destruction of critical infrastructure, and the collapse of Taiwan’s semiconductor production would trigger an estimated $10 trillion global economic shock—nearly a tenth of global GDP.
As Fox News reported, it was the precision and operational relevance of these findings that prompted senior U.S. national security officials to request redactions before the report’s public release. According to the authors, those officials were concerned that adversaries could exploit the analysis to identify or remediate vulnerabilities.
“Redactions were made at the request of the U.S. government to prevent disclosure of information that could reasonably enable an adversary to (1) remediate or ‘close’ critical vulnerabilities that the United States and its allies could otherwise exploit, or (2) identify or exploit U.S. and allied vulnerabilities in ways that could degrade operational endurance, resilience, or deterrence,” the report explains.
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