Repricing Sovereignty

Repricing Sovereignty

Mark Jeftovic

What follows are a couple of excerpts from the last Bitcoin Capitalist Letter, which was a long-form piece that was a refinement of my overall long term investment thesis. It corrects for my biggest mistake in the previous model: the belief that nation states were in secular decline, and centralized government power was waning.

This may be true for the long haul, but for the next five, ten, twenty years – we’re heading into an era that numerous commentators have been identifying, and I’m looping under umbrella “State Capitalism”. 

More specific to our “Great Bifurcation” thesis, what this really means is State Capitalism for the “haves” and  mass compliance and (the warmth of?) collectivism for the  permanent underclass. UBI is coming out of necessity, and anyone who thinks that isn’t going to be some permutation of social credit (most likely based on personal carbon footprint quotas) is ngmi.

Late Stage Globalism

A paper I came across recently was Nicolas Colin’s Late-Cyle Investment Theory, which came out in June ’25 but Colin was recently a guest on Hidden Forces.

Colin’s paper posits that we are entering the maturity phase of the computer/networking information age.

What got my attention, both from the podcast interview with Demetri Kofinas and then as I read through the paper itself, is how it explains the mechanisms by which late-cycle dynamics force governments toward what we’ve described last edition, a global march toward a kind of “state capitalism” and that “uncomfortable reality I have been grappling with for a few months, that The State and The Economy are in the process of merging”.

We’re seeing a kind of  inexorable slide into state-directed capital allocation; it’s taking forms peculiar to its cultural backdrop but it’s happening all over the world.

Russell Napier calls it “National Capitalism”; he also appeared on Hidden Forces a year ago and we covered it in the December ‘24 edition.

WEF luminaries like Marianna Mazzacuto – wholly in favour of the trend – calls it “The Entrepreneurial State”; Tyler Durden over at Zerohedge calls the American expression of it “WHAM” – White House Asset Management.

My favourite version of it is George Gilder’s  “Emergency Socialism”, because it captures the exigencies that are making this a priority among governments worldwide.

Colin is somewhat unique in that he argues high public debt isn’t a policy mistake but a structural feature of technological maturity (not sure I agree, tbh).

As he puts it, governments continue borrowing as if the previous growth regime still applies, even as productivity gains plateau and returns diminish.

The numbers are stark:

• US public debt at 122% of GDP (255% including private sector)

• France at 112% (300% total)

• Japan exceeding 260% public (400% total).

Not mentioned in his paper, but I’ll add that Canada’s total government debt (all levels) is 120%, and our private debt on its own is north of 200%.

These levels dwarf anything seen during the 1970s inflation.

The options, as Colin lays them out, are brutally limited, and this shouldn’t come as a surprise to any of us here.

Governments cannot meaningfully raise taxes, any increases can only be performative and symbolic. Those who pay the lion’s share of them have already demonstrated a willingness to relocate if the “tax the rich” slogans translate into excessive action (we’re already seeing anticipatory exoduses from New York City as Mamdami comes in threatening full-on socialism).

Nor can governments cut spending, because various entitlement programs dominate budgets.

Colin thinks that they can’t outgrow the debt because technological maturity means slower productivity growth, which is the core of his thesis.

He may be right, but I don’t think governments believe that – they are looking at AI to ignite a productivity boom that can outpace the debt bubble.

Whether Colin is correct, or governments believe their own mantra about a productivity miracle in the offing, both roads lead to the same place:

There is only one politically viable path, and that is inflation.

“Run it hot”, basically.

But here’s where Colin’s analysis dovetails with our thesis: inflation has consequences.

As prices rise and real rates fall, voluntary demand for government bonds evaporates (this is why we’ve been seeing yields on sovereign debt spiking higher for over a year).

The one common denominator from those we’ve mentioned above (Colin, Napier, Gilder) is that the most likely outcome is financial repression: policies that force domestic savings into public debt through capital controls, regulatory mandates, and banking rules.

This is the merger of the state and capital that I’ve been warning about. It is a type of financial repression, but the quiet bureaucratic kind where your pension fund must hold treasuries, where capital controls prevent you from moving wealth offshore, where the rules of the game are systematically rigged to channel private savings toward public obligations.

Colin frames this as part of a broader institutional fragmentation. Trade wars, he notes (citing David Skilling), are precursors to capital wars.

States that once relied on global capital markets increasingly treat capital as a strategic resource (hence the advent of things like “Strategic Bitcoin Reserves” – my comment, not his).

The open, rules-based order many still assume to be in place is actively unravelling.

Napier talked about all this a year ago and never once uttered the word “Bitcoin”, let alone crypto.

Colin, for his part, sees crypto and stablecoins as part of the emerging new financial system (sound familiar?), and what’s fascinating is how this all maps onto The Stablecoin Standard thesis we’ve been developing.

He sees dollar-backed stablecoins as America’s attempt to extend monetary hegemony into the digital age, essentially creating a new channel for petrodollar-style recycling where foreign demand for USDT and USDC indirectly finances US government debt.

No surprise here, but it contains an inherent tension: stablecoins work precisely because they route around traditional banking, yet that same feature makes them harder to control when geopolitical pressures mount.

The implication for us is clear and it emerges in a kind of “Barbell trade” portfolio that both recognizes the reality of State Capitalism while also hedging for it via the simultaneous emergence of a parallel system (more on this below).

The big wake-up call for me, is that The State Is “The House”. I’ve spent most of my adult life thinking that it was on its last legs, that at some point a Geopolitical Minsky Moment would demolish the entire scaffolding, and then sound money and free markets would assert themselves.

I was wrong. I’ve now realized that.

The general public will never not believe in the legitimacy of “The State” (even though they may dispute who currently occupies the machinery). It’s baked in since childhood – and it won’t matter that their leaders debase the currency, leach away their wealth, send their children to die in turf wars or even load their neighbours into boxcars. The masses will always believe that The House is legitimate, inevitable and necessary.

With all that said, I still do think that there will be a geopolitical Minsky moment, a kind of global, macro “force majeure” that resets the table, simply because the fiat currency system is well past its “use by” date – but make no mistake, the only thing that happens to The House in the aftermath is that some other faction takes over the lease. And the masses will then dutifully follow the new boss.

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