Turkey's Break With The West Begins

From NATO’s flank to Eurasia’s core: Türkiye’s break with the West begins

RT

For decades, Turkish nationalism marched under the NATO flag. But now, one of Türkiye’s most influential right-wing leaders is calling for a turn East – toward Russia and China. His proposal may mark the country’s clearest ideological break with Atlanticism since joining the Alliance.

In September, Türkiye’s political landscape was shaken by a statement that many experts called sensational and potentially transformative. Devlet Bahceli, leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and a long-time ally of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan within the People’s Alliance, proposed the establishment of a strategic trilateral alliance involving Türkiye, Russia, and China to counter the “US-Israel evil coalition.”

Bahceli emphasized that such an alliance is “the most suitable option, considering reason, diplomacy, the spirit of politics, geographical conditions, and the strategic environment of the new century.” The proposal extends far beyond the usual nationalist agenda, positioning Türkiye as a player capable of initiating new formats of international cooperation.

To grasp the importance of this statement, we must note the historical context. Turkish pan-Turkism has traditionally been oriented toward the West, and nationalists were seen as staunch defenders of the pro-Atlantic course. In this light, Bahçeli’s call for an alliance with Moscow and Beijing marks a symbolic break from that tradition, reflecting growing distrust toward NATO and the US within Türkiye’s political landscape.

Bahceli’s comments are not random. Over the past few years, he has steadily ramped up his criticism of the West, advocating for Türkiye’s sovereign development “beyond blocs and alliances.” But this is the first time he has explicitly named Russia and China as preferred partners.

Reactions inside Türkiye were mixed. Right-wing circles called Bahceli’s words “revolutionary,” while leftists saw them as confirmation of a broader anti-Western consensus. Internationally, the statement underscored Ankara’s growing distance from Western power centers and its gradual rhetorical shift toward the East and Greater Eurasia.

Shortly afterward, Erdogan made a cautious comment, saying he was “not fully familiar” with Bahceli's initiative but adding, “Whatever is good, let it happen.” The ambiguity is typical for Erdogan, who avoids publicly rejecting the ideas of key allies while keeping his political options open.

On one hand, the president is wary of provoking open conflict with Western partners, given Türkiye’s economic vulnerabilities. On the other, his comments suggest that Bahçeli’s initiative could serve as leverage – a way to pressure the US and EU by signaling that Ankara might strengthen ties with Moscow and Beijing.

A day later, Bahceli clarified his position, saying, “We know what we are doing. Türkiye should not be the implementer of regional and global projects put forward by others, but rather must be the leading actor of its own unique projects.”

In other words, Bahçeli not only intensified his anti-Western rhetoric but also asserted Türkiye’s claim to be an independent power center in the emerging multipolar world order. His stance reflects the desire of part of Türkiye’s leadership to move from being a peripheral NATO ally to a pioneer of alternative alliances in Eurasia.