Aynaz Anni Cyrus
When Axios leaked details on September 16, 2025, of Israel’s quiet negotiations with Syria’s new government, the headlines looked clinical: demilitarized zones, no-fly areas, and a guaranteed air corridor eastward.
On the surface, that reads like Israel is cementing its security. But step back, and you see something far more dangerous. What’s being described is not a defensive arrangement.
It is a document that risks giving Iran protection under the cover of a ceasefire and giving Syria’s fragile Islamist-rooted regime international legitimacy it has not earned.
The Syrian state is now in the hands of a transitional government, established after the collapse of the old order in late 2024. At its center is Ahmed al-Sharaa, installed as transitional president in January 2025 under an interim constitution. Al-Sharaa is not a technocrat or a neutral caretaker; he rose from the ranks of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a group born out of al-Qaeda’s Syrian branch.
This “caretaker” government is a patchwork of Islamist factions and fragile alliances, not a stable democracy. For Israel to sit across the table from al-Sharaa is not to negotiate with a reformed state, but to legitimize a leadership that grew out of jihadist networks and continues to operate within Tehran’s orbit.
Demilitarized and no-fly areas southwest of Damascus, meant to create buffers along Israel’s frontier. The idea is to keep aircraft, drones, and heavy weapons back. But no-fly zones are only as strong as the regime enforcing them, and Syria has long let Iran and its proxies operate freely.
A protected aerial corridor eastward, giving Israel written assurance it can cross Syrian skies to reach Iran if strikes are needed. This is the centerpiece. It looks like a safeguard, but once codified, it becomes a framework Iran can study, exploit, and use to rally international pressure whenever Israel acts.
Israel frames the deal as an update to the 1974 disengagement agreement, borrowing language from the 1979 peace treaty with Egypt. On paper, it appears precedent. In reality, it is new: Israel asking Damascus for permission slips on its most critical defense priority, stopping Iran’s nuclear march.
The corridor is the key. Israel believes it is securing access, but any agreement signed with Damascus would almost certainly include maps, boundaries, and operational limits. Once those details are written down and formalized, they do not stay secret. Agreements are archived, shared with guarantors such as the United States or Russia, circulated through the United Nations system, and often leaked or referenced in diplomatic channels.
Iran already has deep networks inside Syria.
Intelligence officers, militias, and political allies ensure that whatever Syria signs will make its way to Tehran. Once Iran has access to those maps, it gains advance knowledge of Israel’s intended routes and restrictions. In war, surprise is everything. If Iran knows where Israel is likely to fly and what areas Israel has promised to avoid, then Israel’s most valuable advantage, unpredictability, is lost.
The danger is not only in the words written on paper. It is the visibility Israel hands to its enemy by locking strategy into a framework that Damascus cannot keep out of Tehran’s reach.
This is not speculation. The Oslo Accords produced detailed maps that Hamas studied and later used to plan attacks. The 2005 withdrawal from Gaza created a vacuum that Hamas filled, turning it into one of the most entrenched terror bases in the world. Each time Israel trusted agreements to protect its borders, its enemies used the paperwork as weapons.
By negotiating with Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government today, Israel is repeating that mistake on a larger scale.
Israel does not need Damascus to approve its survival. A government led by an HTS commander is not a security partner.
A corridor to Tehran mapped out in Damascus is not an advantage; it is a trap.
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