The killing of Ahmed Jabari in November 2012 marked a dramatic turning point in the conflict between Israel and Hamas. Jabari, Hamas’s top military commander, was killed in Gaza while traveling in his vehicle. Israel immediately braced for retaliation, and Hamas responded with massive rocket fire toward Israeli cities, including Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, triggering Operation Pillar of Defense.
The contrast between what happened then and what is happening today is almost unimaginable.
On May 15 of this year, Israel eliminated Izz al-Din al-Haddad, Hamas’s chief military commander in Gaza. Ten days later, on May 26, Israel killed his successor, Mohammed Odeh. In the past, such consecutive blows against Hamas’s senior military leadership would almost automatically have triggered a major regional escalation.
Yet this time, no significant response came.
These operations are not isolated events. They are part of a broader strategic process Israel has been carrying out in Gaza over recent months: the systematic destruction of Hamas’s military infrastructure, including command centers, weapons depots, tunnel networks, and operatives across multiple levels of command.
At the same time, Israel has steadily expanded its operational and territorial control inside the Gaza Strip. Today, Israel reportedly controls approximately 65% of Gaza….
That is up from the 53% of Gazan territory, to the east of the Yellow Line, that the IDF controlled just a few weeks ago. And the IDF will not stop at 65%, but intends to control at least 70% of Gaza before it calls a halt to its advance.
The only country with influence over Israel’s campaign in Gaza is the United States, and the administration has made clear that Israel is free to do whatever it deems necessary in Gaza.
It is Israel, not Hamas, that is winning in Gaza. It has inexorably taken over more and more of the Strip’s territory, now 65%, and soon to be 70% of the total. Out of an estimated initial total of 400 miles of Hamas tunnels, the IDF has destroyed at least 150 miles. With each passing day, the IDF locates more, and destroys more, of the tunnel network. On October 7, 2023, the IDF estimates that Hamas had 40,000 men under arms in Gaza. Since then, the IDF estimates it has killed at least 25,000 of them. Hamas has managed to recruit an estimated 5,000 new recruits during the war, which leaves it with a total of 20,000, that is only half as many men as it had before October 7. By any measure, Hamas is losing badly. And inside Gaza, anti-Hamas militias have sprung up to keep their own neighborhoods free of Hamas and therefore, they hope, free of IDF attacks. There are four of these militias: first, the Popular Forces, with some 700 fighters, who operate in eastern Rafah and Khan Yunis; second, the Al-Astal Militia, who operate around Qizal al-Najjar in the Khan Yunis governorate; third, the Popular Army (Northern branch), that operates out of northern Gaza; fourth, Rami Helles’ Militia, operating in the eastern areas of Gaza City. Hamas has issued threats to these militias to disband and join Hamas, but so far it has been afraid to take any of them on.
Hamas is now so weak that it does not dare to attack even the smallest of these militias.