Can the West still engineer a ‘color revolution’? We’re about to find out

Fyodor Lukyanov: Can the West still engineer a ‘color revolution’? We’re about to find out

RT

A ‘color revolution’, as we define it, is a mass uprising fueled by the rejection of official election results, backed by political, diplomatic, and financial support from external forces. This idea first took root in Serbia in 2000, with the overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic. The term itself emerged three years later in Georgia, where protesters led by Mikhail Saakashvili adopted roses as their symbol. Another three years later, Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution marked the color shift to orange.

A decade ago, color revolutions seemed to have peaked, especially after the bloody Euromaidan in Ukraine, which plunged the country into a prolonged series of armed conflicts. This development made previous uprisings appear relatively tame. The phenomenon appeared to have receded, only to reemerge in Armenia in 2018 – though this was more of an internal shift than an externally influenced one. Meanwhile, Belarus’s failed 2020 revolution, met with stern resistance from authorities and a clear warning from Moscow, looked like a line in the sand.

Yet, the situation in Georgia today – with large pro-Western opposition protests – suggests the possibility of a new mass protest, though it is dramatically different from the past. The ruling Georgian Dream party has locked itself into an intense standoff with the political West, particularly with the US and EU. It is surprising to see Georgia’s government stand so firmly against its Western partners, but there is little choice; as history has shown, the US-led bloc does not tolerate half-measures when its interests are at stake.

Bidzina Ivanishvili, the founder of Georgian Dream, and his party base their strategy on three main conclusions:

Firstly, Western Europe and the US, preoccupied with issues far beyond the South Caucasus, are unlikely to direct the same level of political and material resources to Georgia as they did in previous revolutions. In today’s global environment, Tbilisi is simply not a priority.

Secondly, the context has changed. When the Rose Revolution unfolded in 2003, Georgia was in a dire state. The government, led by Eduard Shevardnadze, was deeply unpopular, and the country was in disarray. Today, Georgia enjoys relative stability and economic growth. While challenges persist, the choice between real prosperity and a fleeting, uncertain promise of Western-led change has shifted the balance of opinion in favor of continuity.

Thirdly, regime change in Georgia now would almost certainly lead to chaos. The experience of countries in the region shows that compromises and yielding to external pressure lead to the collapse of governments. Ivanishvili’s strategy is clear: Resist Western influence, as succumbing to it has proven disastrous for others.

However, the Tbilisi authorities’ calculations could be flawed. The significance of events in Georgia now extends beyond its borders, especially in light of the escalating tensions over Ukraine and political shifts in the US. The West’s desire to undermine what it perceives as pro-Russian forces has made Georgia a symbolic battleground, amplifying the consequences of any perceived defiance. The fact that Georgian Dream is in no way pro-Russian, but simply seeks to maintain a detached position, does not change the situation.

Tbilisi’s decision to freeze EU accession talks was a bold move, signaling its willingness to challenge Western demands. The EU sees its ability to influence its applicants as a point of pride, and any setback, like Georgia’s hesitation, will be seen as a failure of its policies. Those who are seen as clients of the West must now swear an oath. And unwillingness to follow the common path is equated with treason.

More...