More on this possibility can be found here: “Iran’s middle class uprising poses new security challenge for Israel,” by Avi Ashkenazi, Jerusalem Post, January 1, 2026:
Israeli defense officials are closely monitoring whether Iran might attempt a last-ditch missile attack on Israel as the regime grows weaker, officials said on Thursday.
According to Israel’s defense establishment, Tehran does not currently want a war, and its capacity is limited, yet the possibility of a sudden strike cannot be dismissed. Officials said the IDF and security agencies have raised their alert and are tracking Iranian readiness for a surprise launch.
Of course Iran doesn’t want a war with Israel — it has just begun to recover from the battering it received in June — but if it concludes that this is the only way to keep the regime in power, as Iranians would presumably rally round the flag, then another defeat might be worth it.
Israel believes that Iran is attempting to restore its ballistic missile arsenal quickly, using local industry. Even so, they assess that Tehran has not recovered the number of missiles and launchers it held on the eve of the Israel-Iran war. Officials also dispute Western media tallies of newly produced Iranian missiles.
“The Iranian government has set its own priorities: first, to reestablish an offensive posture against Israel before dealing with Iran’s economic distress, water shortages, and welfare problems,” a senior military source said.
Inside Iran, a deepening water crisis, alongside severe economic strain, has prompted people to take to the streets. Officials note that Iran’s 1978–79 revolution was driven in part by similar socioeconomic grievances. Much of the largely secular middle class, they say, has been squeezed to the wall by the cost of living, and “no military or police force can halt a tide of hungry and thirsty citizens.”…
The Iranian regime might launch an attack on Israel in a final spasm of hatred — a last blow before the regime goes under — or perhaps as a way to appeal to Iranians to rally round the regime when Israel responds to Iran with its own attack. Or — a third alternative — the Iranian regime may believe that with a surprise attack on Israel, it might actually do damage to the hated Zionists, and Iranians would then, in a fit of nationalist pride, curb their demonstrations against the government. None is likely, but all are possible. Thinking rationally, after all, is not the Supreme Leader’s strong suit.
