Ukraine, Russia, and the Danger of Nuclear Attack on Europe
I’m writing to recommend a remarkable discussion between John Mearsheimer (an endowed professor of political science at the University of Chicago) and the influential, religiously conservative, hawkish Russian nuclear strategist, Sergey Karaganov. The discussion was hosted and moderated by Professor Glenn Diesen (University of South-Eastern Norway).
You’ll need a bit of patience to understand some of Karaganov’s comments. His English is halting, and he sometimes mumbles — especially during the opening segment of the discussion. But it is well worth hanging in and attending closely. And all becomes perfectly clear as the discussion progresses. Mearsheimer does a good job of re-articulating and clarifying any points that Karaganov does not himself make sufficiently clear.
The discussion is fascinating. It provides deep insights into nuclear strategy and makes clear the great danger of the present moment for Europe — and all of us. Europe, if it continues on its current path, and Karaganov’s program is implemented, will be struck by a conventional missile attack from Russia, which then — after a conventional retaliation by Europe and/or the U.S. — likely will lead to a nuclear attack on Europe
Mearsheimer does an impressive job of maintaining collegial, and even, at moments, warm interactions with Karaganov — an indirect form of personal diplomacy. I believe that this is extremely important, as human interactions can have a decisive influence, even in contexts such as this one, in international affairs. Humiliations that are inflicted at the level of individual interactions can lead to global disasters. Conversely, respectful interactions, even in exceptionally trying circumstances, can help both sides draw back from dangerously destructive conflicts, even at late stages. I found the human level of the interactions the most heartening part of the discussion.
As Karaganov describes it — and I believe he is being forthright — this attack would be carried out not as an expansionist or intentionally aggressive strategy. In fact, for reasons described below, it could not function in this way. Rather, it would be an attempt to (as Karaganov describes it) “sober-up” European leaders. These leaders seem to have lost any fear of direct conflict with Russia, and they are increasingly seeking to confront Russia militarily, not just through the proxy of Ukraine. In other words, this very hawkish plan would be a Russian attempt to “reestablish deterrence.” Karaganov genuinely seems to believe that this approach is the best way to avoid a large-scale nuclear war with uncontrolled escalation.
You may not like Karaganov’s viewpoint or his strategy. But, I would assert, you must understand it — because it if European leaders persist on their current path, it will become increasingly posssible, perhaps even probable, that Karaganov’s plan will be implemented and that Europe will be on the receiving end of a nuclear attack.
Let me summarize my understanding of what Karaganov is proposing:
Step 1: Russia launches a limited conventional (non-nuclear) missile attack on selected targets in Europe.
Step 2: Europe (and/or the U.S.) respond in kind with a conventional missile attack on selected targets in Europe.
Step 3: Russia launches a nuclear attack on selected targets in Europe.
Step 4: In this scenario there is no Step 4. The conflict ends without further immediate exchanges, escalation, or military conflict of any sort. Europe does not respond with it’s own limited nuclear arsenal (in France and the UK) for fear of being utterly wiped out with a Russian nuclear response. The U.S. does not respond with its own nuclear attack on Russia because it knows that this would immediately trigger a strategic nuclear war, destroying the U.S. (and Russia, of course). So, the exchange ends with Russia’s limited attack on Europe. Deterrence is reestablished on Russia’s terms. Russia is not, however, incentivised to use its new position to expand or significantly coerce the West in other ways, because it knows that doing so is more likely to trigger a nuclear retaliation, and this heightens the risk for Russia. But we must be clear: Even a very “limited” nuclear attack on selected European military and industrial targets probably would kill millions, and quite possibly tens of millions, of Europeans.
This scenario is becoming increasingly likely, I believe, as European leaders seem almost willfully to misunderstand what is happening, why it is happening, and what Russia’s actual goals and concerns are. It has been clear from the start of this conflict — actually, from long before the start of the war — that Russia has not been acting as an expansionary power but rather has been responding to a decades long attempt by the West, especially by the U.S. and NATO, to weaponize Ukraine against Russia, and to do so right on Russia’s border. In a similar but reverse situation, the U.S. would long ago have gone to war to remove the threat.
But these European leaders appear to be entirely blind to this — or, since they are substantially responsible for the course of events, they are psychologically and politically motivated to actively deny the reality. Instead of acknowledging this reality — including the reality of their own terrible and ongoing failures — these leaders are doubling down. They appear to be incapable of changing course.
