Several European Countries Issue Joint Statement: Ready To Contribute To Efforts To Reopen The Strait of Hormuz.

Countries want to contribute to safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz

Sweden Herald

Several European countries said in a joint statement with Japan that they are ready to contribute to efforts to reopen the Strait of Hormuz.

"We express our willingness to contribute to appropriate initiatives to ensure safe passage through the strait," reads the statement from Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Japan.

They add that they welcome “the commitment from countries involved in preparedness planning.”

US President Donald Trump, who, together with Israel, started the war that triggered the situation in Hormuz, the other day launched an angry attack on allied countries for not wanting to contribute forces to the Strait of Hormuz.

France has pointed out that it is not a party to the conflict and that it will therefore not participate militarily in Hormuz under the current situation.

Traffic in the strait, through which much of the world's energy supplies pass, has been blocked by Iran in response to Israeli and US attacks.

"We call on Iran to immediately cease its threats, mine laying, drone and missile attacks, and other methods of blocking the strait," the six countries wrote in their statement.

They add that they will also take measures to try to “stabilize energy markets,” including persuading “certain energy-producing countries to increase their production.”

Israel has just set off a chain reaction that will set the Gulf on fire

Israel has just set off a chain reaction that will set the Gulf on fire

RT

By March 19, 2026, the pattern is unmistakable. What began as a war centered on Israel, Iran, Lebanon, and the waters around the Strait of Hormuz has now spilled decisively into the infrastructure heart of the Gulf monarchies.

The most firmly established Iranian strike on Gulf energy infrastructure so far is the missile attack on Qatar’s Ras Laffan industrial complex, the largest LNG hub on earth, carried out after Israel struck Iran’s South Pars gas field. 

At the same time, earlier Iranian retaliatory waves had already hit or endangered critical nodes across the wider Gulf arc, including the Saudi oil center at Ras Tanura, port and fuel infrastructure in the UAE at Jebel Ali, Zayed Port, and Fujairah, as well as military and fuel-related sites in Bahrain. 

Other targets publicly named by Iran or discussed in market reporting, such as Jubail, Samref, Al Hosn, and the Red Sea export route through Yanbu, belong to a second category where threats, interceptions, and partial reporting often run ahead of full independent verification. Yet even in that fog, the strategic message is crystal clear. Iran is no longer merely threatening the energy order of the Gulf. It is testing how far it can break it.

The logic of these strikes is brutally simple. The Gulf monarchies are rich, technologically sophisticated, and heavily armed, but much of their economic life remains concentrated in coastal infrastructure that is difficult to hide, difficult to harden completely, and even harder to restore quickly under fire. Refineries, loading terminals, gas separation plants, desalination systems, export jetties, storage farms, and power networks are not abstract assets on a spreadsheet. They are the circulatory system of the region. Damage them and you do not merely lower output – you threaten electricity, water, transport, state revenues, insurance markets, shipping schedules, and domestic confidence all at once. 

That is why the strike on Ras Laffan mattered so much more than a single explosion on a map. It was a signal that the war had crossed into the one domain Gulf rulers fear most, the domain where geopolitical conflict turns into systemic economic paralysis. Reuters and other reporting also show how even intercepted drones and missiles have caused fires and disruption in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, demonstrating that in this kind of war, a partial interception is not the same thing as security.

Ras Laffan is not just another industrial site. It is the crown jewel of Qatar’s energy model and one of the pillars of the global gas trade. Damage there reverberates far beyond Doha. It reaches power utilities in Asia, gas buyers in Europe, tanker routes, spot prices, inflation expectations, and the strategic calculations of every government that hoped the Gulf would remain the last reliable ballast in a disordered energy world.

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Invasion incoming? Lebanon braces for an Israeli onslaught

Invasion incoming? Lebanon braces for an Israeli onslaught

RT

Yegia Teshyan, coordinator of the Regional and International Relations Cluster at the Issam Fares Institute of Public Policy and International Relations at the American University of Beirut, spoke to the editor of Russia in Global Affairs, Fyodor Lukyanov, about the growing risk of a major war in Lebanon.

With Hezbollah opening a second front against Israel and fears mounting of a wider regional escalation, Lebanon once again finds itself on the edge. Teshyan outlines the possible scenarios, from a limited conflict to a full-scale invasion, and warns of deep internal divisions that could prove just as dangerous as any external threat.

The interview was prepared for the program International Review on the Russia 24 TV network. 

Fyodor Lukyanov: They expect Israel to launch a full-scale operation in Lebanon, don’t they? What do they think about that? What does the Lebanese government intend to do?

Yegia Teshyan: Well, that’s the million-dollar question: what will the Lebanese government do, if anything? Last week, Hezbollah coordinated attacks on Israel with the IRGC, firing around 100 rockets from various locations in Lebanon, not just the south. This took the Israelis and many analysts by surprise, given the damage inflicted on Hezbollah over the past two years.

How likely is an invasion, and what are the potential scenarios? The likelihood of a full-scale invasion or direct confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel is growing, so many in Lebanon are now considering a range of possible scenarios rather than expecting one clear outcome.

One possible scenario is an intense but limited exchange, including expanded airstrikes on the southern suburbs of Beirut, targeted operations and assassinations, as well as ongoing cross-border clashes. There could also be a limited ground incursion. Israel has announced that it now occupies eighteen locations in southern Lebanon, compared to five before the war.

However, there is also growing concern that Israel may expand its campaign along the lines of 2006 and 1982, extending the zone of occupation and invading southern Lebanon to destroy Hezbollah’s leadership and capabilities.

Many people still remember the destruction of the 2006 war and fear it could happen again. This concern is heightened by the country’s severe economic crisis, financial collapse, and fragile state institutions. The issue of internal cohesion is therefore critical. Civil society groups, universities, and various networks are quietly preparing contingency plans, particularly in response to the growing number of internally displaced people.

The mood in Lebanon is one of anxiety and deep unease, but above all there is acute social polarization. I am concerned not only about what might happen during a future war, but also about its aftermath. I am reminded of 2008, when clashes broke out in Beirut. Society was deeply divided: some argued that Hezbollah must be disarmed before negotiations with Israel, while others, particularly within the Shia community, see this as an existential war. If they are destined to die, they say, they will take the country down with them. These views are now being expressed openly, which is very dangerous.

Another viewpoint, held by other communities and opposition parties, is that this is not Lebanon’s war. They see it as a proxy conflict, with Lebanon caught at the center, a deeply destructive position.

There are three possible outcomes.

The first is a limited war followed by a negotiated ceasefire. However, I do not expect a ceasefire in the near future. Israel is likely to push further. The US and Israel do not believe the Lebanese government can disarm Hezbollah. The army simply lacks the capacity and heavy weaponry.

Second, a large-scale Israeli ground invasion could take place in the near future, though its scope remains unclear.

Third, and most dangerous, is regional escalation. There are growing concerns that Syria could become involved. Reports suggest Syrian forces have been deployed near the border. Syrian officials say this is a precautionary measure, not preparation for intervention. However, earlier reports indicated a possible security arrangement between Syria and Israel, of which details remain unclear. This uncertainty is fueling speculation that Syria could be drawn in, potentially leading to clashes with Hezbollah.

The Syrian army has claimed Hezbollah fired rockets across the border, though Hezbollah denies this. I am concerned that Syria could intervene, which would significantly widen the conflict. From Damascus’s perspective, Hezbollah is also a threat, so weakening it may serve Syrian interests. But the reaction of border populations, largely Sunni and highly religious, remains uncertain.

Birthpains of WWIII?

Historians Will Say World War III Already Began

Martin Armstrong

For years, the press has insisted that every conflict must be viewed in isolation: Ukraine is separate from the Middle East, China is separate from Russia, and Iran is simply another regional crisis. But history rarely works that way. When historians look back at major wars, they rarely begin them on the date politicians announce them. World War I did not suddenly begin with a single shot in Sarajevo, and World War II was not simply the invasion of Poland. The causes were decades in the making. The uncomfortable reality is that when historians eventually write about this period, many will likely conclude that what we are witnessing today is the early phases of a world war.

One of the greatest mistakes made after the Cold War was the assumption that the ideological struggle had been permanently resolved. The collapse of the Soviet Union was treated as a final victory rather than the end of a phase. Yet no durable geopolitical framework was created to integrate the defeated power structure into a stable international system. 

After World War II, the United States and its allies invested enormous resources into rebuilding Europe and Japan through the Marshall Plan and establishing institutions such as the United Nations and the Bretton Woods financial order. Those efforts created stability and prevented the reemergence of the same ideological conflict that produced two world wars. After the Cold War, nothing comparable was built.

Instead, Russia and other former Soviet states were left to endure economic collapse, political humiliation, and social chaos during the 1990s. Entire populations watched their national power evaporate while Western institutions expanded eastward. Whether one agrees with the political narratives or not is irrelevant. What matters historically is that unresolved tensions remained. Just as the Treaty of Versailles failed to resolve the deeper contradictions after World War I, the end of the Cold War left grievances that continued to grow beneath the surface.

Now those unresolved tensions are resurfacing simultaneously across multiple regions. Russia is locked in confrontation with the West in Ukraine. China is challenging the global economic and military balance in the Pacific. The Middle East is once again erupting, with Iran increasingly aligned with Russia and China as geopolitical pressure mounts. These are not isolated events. They are overlapping theaters of strategic competition that increasingly resemble the early stages of great-power conflict.

z

The Economic Confidence Model has long projected that the period around 2026 would mark a geopolitical turning point. That does not mean a sudden global war declared overnight. 

Historically, major conflicts emerge through a series of regional crises that gradually merge into a broader struggle. The Panic Cycle expected in 2027, and the larger turning point into 2028, suggest rising volatility and confrontation across multiple fronts. What we are seeing today fits that pattern perfectly. If history is any guide, future historians may not mark the beginning of the next world war with a single event. They may instead look back and say the war had already begun during this decade but we simply failed to recognize it at the time.

Seven clocks are running:

TIK TOK

Shanaka Anslem Perera

Seven clocks are running. None of them negotiable. All of them counting down to the same weeks.

The planting clock. Mid-April is the biological deadline for corn and soybean planting across the US Midwest. Every day that passes without nitrogen becoming affordable and available narrows the window for corn. USDA projects corn falling to 94 million acres from 98.8 million. Soybeans rising to 85 million from 81.2 million. The seeds that go into the ground in the next three weeks determine America’s grain harvest in October. The decision is irreversible.

The USDA clock. March 31. Prospective Plantings. The report that converts farmer intentions into official data. Every acreage number, every corn-soy ratio, every nitrogen-dependent calculation becomes a published fact that traders, governments, and food agencies will use to model global supply for the next twelve months. The number arrives in twelve days.

The FAO clock. April 3. The Food Price Index. The first global reading that captures post-Hormuz commodity prices across cereals, vegetable oils, dairy, meat, and sugar. The 2022 peak was 159.7 in March 2022 after Ukraine. This reading will incorporate oil above $100, urea at $610, LNG halted, packaging repriced, and freight surcharges of $500 to $1,500 per container. The number that determines whether the UN declares a food emergency arrives in fifteen days.

The pharmaceutical clock. India’s API inventory buffers are two to three months, measured from the war’s onset on February 28. Late May is the depletion window. Methanol at 87.7 percent Hormuz exposure feeds the solvent chain for paracetamol, ibuprofen, metformin, and antibiotics. Once buffers deplete, the shortage becomes a patient access crisis for the 47 percent of US generics that originate in India.

The China crude clock. FGE NexantECA confirmed China is drawing commercial reserves at up to one million barrels per day. The draw sustains refinery operations for four to six weeks from March 19. Mid-April to late April is the exhaustion window. After that, China faces three options: accelerate Russian pipeline imports, reroute at massive premium, or crack open the strategic petroleum reserve. The third option reprices every commodity on the planet.

The helium clock. SK Hynix and Samsung hold two to three months of helium inventory. Late May to early June is the depletion window. South Korea imports 64.7 percent of its helium from Qatar. Ras Laffan is offline. If helium buffers deplete before alternative supply arrives, semiconductor fabrication faces rationing. The AI hardware supply chain hits a physical wall measured in months, not quarters.

The insurance clock. Solvency II requires 30 to 60 days of zero incidents before P&I clubs can reinstate war risk coverage. Even after a ceasefire, the insurance normalisation takes six to sixteen months based on the Red Sea precedent of 26 months and counting. The logistics system lags the financial relief rally by the longest duration of any clock in this crisis.

Seven clocks. The shortest expires in twelve days. The longest runs for over a year. The planting window, the USDA report, the FAO index, the drug buffers, the Chinese crude draw, the helium inventory, and the insurance cycle are all counting down simultaneously. None of them pause for diplomacy. None of them respond to presidential directives. None of them read sealed packets.

The calendar is the only actor in this war that has never lost a negotiation.