America Pays A High Moral And Material Price For Its Alliance With The Saudis

America Pays a High Moral & Material Price for Its Alliance With the Saudis

In a no-nonsense analysis examining the high material, moral and ethical price Washington pays for its alliance with Saudi Arabia, Cato Institute Senior Fellow Doug Bandow suggests that it's high time for the United States to abandon any illusions it might have about the nature of the Saudi regime, and ultimately, to disentangle itself from Riyadh.

Over the weekend, US Secretary of State John Kerry arrived in Saudi Arabia to discuss bilateral and regional issues with the country's senior leadership. Attempting to sooth the Saudis' concerns that the Iran nuclear deal may have undermined the Washington's commitment to Riyadh, Kerry emphasized that this wasn't the case.

"We have as solid a relationship, as clear an alliance, and as strong a friendship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as we ever had, and nothing has changed," Kerry said, quoted in a statement released by the State Department on Sunday.

This, according to Cato Institute Senior Fellow Doug Bandow, is the exact opposite of the approach Washington needs to take when it comes to its relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Bandow lays out his case in the Washington-based foreign policy magazine The National Interest.

"Washington's long relationship with Riyadh was built on oil," the analyst writes. However, "there was never any nonsense about sharing values with the KSA, which operates as a slightly more civilized variant of the Islamic State. For instance, heads are chopped off, but only after a nominal trial. Women have no more rights, but can afford a better life."

The reality, Bandow, notes, is that "the royals run a totalitarian system which prohibits political dissent, free speech, religious liberty and social autonomy. In its latest human rights report, the U.S. State Department devoted an astonishing 57 pages detailing the Saudi monarchy’s human rights abuses. To the extent that personal freedom exists, it is only in private. But even then the authorities may intervene at pleasure."

"At a time of heavy US dependence on foreign oil, a little compromise in America's principles might have seemed in order," the analyst, a former special advisor the president during the Reagan administration, slyly noted. 

However, "even then, of course, the KSA could not control the international oil market and the royals could not long survive if they did not sell their oil. They needed buyers as much if not more than buyers needed them."

"Today, however, it’s hard to make a case that petroleum warrants Washington’s 'special relationship' with Saudi Arabia. The global energy market is expanding; Iran has begun selling more oil; new sources such as tight oil have come on line; U.S. crude oil production is the highest it has been in decades. Most important, the royal regime cannot survive without oil revenues and has continued to pump even as prices have collapsed."

From the geostrategic tack, Bandow recalled that Washington has used Riyadh in recent years "as an integral component of a containment system against Iran. Of course, much of the 'Tehran problem' was made in America: overthrowing Iranian democracy and empowering the Shah, a corrupt, repressive modernizer, led to his ouster and the creation of an Islamist state. Washington's subsequent support for Iraq's Saddam Hussein in his aggressive war against Iran only intensified the Islamist regime's antagonism."

"Fears multiplied as Tehran confronted its Sunni neighbors along with Israel and continued the Shah's nuclear program. Overwrought nightmares of Islamic revolution throughout the region encouraged America’s fulsome embrace of the KSA and allied regimes, such as Bahrain, where a Shia majority is held captive by a Sunni monarch backed by the Saudi military."

Held captive by such strategic considerations, "in Riyadh, Secretary Kerry [thus] declared America's undiminished support for the world's leading feudal kleptocracy."

"Washington's long relationship with Riyadh was built on oil," the analyst writes. However, "there was never any nonsense about sharing values with the KSA, which operates as a slightly more civilized variant of the Islamic State. For instance, heads are chopped off, but only after a nominal trial. Women have no more rights, but can afford a better life."

The reality, Bandow, notes, is that "the royals run a totalitarian system which prohibits political dissent, free speech, religious liberty and social autonomy. In its latest human rights report, the U.S. State Department devoted an astonishing 57 pages detailing the Saudi monarchy’s human rights abuses. To the extent that personal freedom exists, it is only in private. But even then the authorities may intervene at pleasure."

"Today, however, it’s hard to make a case that petroleum warrants Washington’s 'special relationship' with Saudi Arabia. The global energy market is expanding; Iran has begun selling more oil; new sources such as tight oil have come on line; U.S. crude oil production is the highest it has been in decades. Most important, the royal regime cannot survive without oil revenues and has continued to pump even as prices have collapsed."

From the geostrategic tack, Bandow recalled that Washington has used Riyadh in recent years "as an integral component of a containment system against Iran. Of course, much of the 'Tehran problem' was made in America: overthrowing Iranian democracy and empowering the Shah, a corrupt, repressive modernizer, led to his ouster and the creation of an Islamist state. Washington's subsequent support for Iraq's Saddam Hussein in his aggressive war against Iran only intensified the Islamist regime's antagonism."

Ultimately, Bandow writes, "whatever the alleged benefits of the Saudi alliance, America pays a high price."

In the last few years especially, the analyst notes, "Riyadh's behavior has become more harmful to America's interests. The monarchy has been pushing to oust Syria's Assad without worrying about who or what would follow. To the contrary, Riyadh had subsidized and armed many of the most extreme opposition factions." Furthermore, "in Yemen, Saudi Arabia turned a long-term insurgency into another sectarian conflict. In the process, the royals have been committing war crimes and creating a humanitarian disaster."

As a caveat, Bandow recommends that whatever Washington does, recognizing Riyadh's role as a destabilizing force in the Middle East "does not mean that the United States should attempt regime change…America has proved that it isn't very good at overseas social engineering –consider Afghanistan, Egypt, Haiti, Iraq, Kosovo, Libya, Somalia, Syria and elsewhere." But at the very minimum, Washington must "stop lavishing attention, praise, support, and reassurance on the Saudi royals."