Last week, Ukraine launched an incursion into Russia proper, in the Kursk region (WWII historians are well aware of Kursk).
Previously, Ukraine had not sent large-scale forces across the border into Russia proper.Ukraine sent in as many as six (likely understrength) brigades, supported by tanks and armored vehicles.
Let’s get real, though: That’s not anywhere enough to invade Russia. (Ask Napoleon.) And this was how far? A few miles?
The attack has already bogged down.
Meanwhile, how will Ukraine keep its troops and vehicles supplied with fuel, ammunition, food and other supplies? And considering that this is a combat action, what of medical evacuation of the wounded?
Yeah, right; good luck.
Frankly, it’s difficult to see any military logic to this Ukrainian incursion, other than to grab headlines for a few days with a tactical PR stunt. But even Western media is questioning the point of it all.
At higher levels of military thought, what’s the operational method here? What’s Ukraine’s goal, other than to send troops on a suicide mission, kill some Russians and lose a bunch of irreplaceable equipment?
There’s a lot of speculation that Ukraine intended its forces to seize a Russian nuclear power plant near Kursk; but from the map it’s a long reach, about 75 miles away.
I’ve seen other speculation that Ukraine’s move might force Russia to shift troops away from other areas of the current front lines in the southeast. Well, no, because Russia has nearly half a million combat troops — yes, an entire other army — in reserve positions scattered across the western part of the country, not currently engaged with Ukraine along the lines of contact.
And as for strategic effect? Well, not to put too fine a point on things, but this Ukrainian attack is in the order of magnitude of zero. It changes nothing and looks kind of foolish in the process.
At strategic levels, the outcome of this Russia-Ukraine conflict is already decided. Russia has far more people than Ukraine and can raise a much larger army. Russia has more and better military systems: tanks, artillery, etc.
And Russia’s logistics effort is right next door, based on internal lines of communication, well-developed road and rail corridors and well-practiced military hierarchies that date back to the Crimean War of the 1850s.
At every level, Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk is a doomed mission. The soldiers will be killed or captured, and the equipment will wind up in Russian war museums.
Indeed, for Ukraine the war is over except for all the fighting and dying. Although it’s fair to ask, if the war is “over,” then why isn’t it yet finished? How do things conclude?
Well, all in due time.
Below, I show you the Russian art of war, and how it differs from the U.S. approach to fighting wars.
Can the U.S. model survive in today’s new environment? Read on.
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