Usually when we peek behind the curtains we see George Soros lurking, but there is another key player in the current global events:
"We are, and I don't want to sound alarmist but I am alarmed, closer to the actual possibility of war with Russia than we have ever been since the Cuban missile crisis. That's how bad it's been." (Stephen Cohen)
Brzezinski's obsession derives from British geographer Sir Halford Mackinder's 1904 definition of the Central-Eastern nations of Europe as the "Pivot Area", whose geographic position made them "the vital springboards for the attainment of continental domination." Whether anyone realizes it, the Obama administration's current campaign against Russia in Ukraine is of Mackinder's design brought forward by Brzezinski.
To an expert like Stephen Cohen, the Obama administration's indictment of Russia over Ukraine "doesn't correspond to the facts and above all it has no logic." But a look back forty years reveals that a lot of Cold War thinking wasn't fact-based either and it may now be instructive to look for answers to Washington's current dose of illogic in the covert origins of the U.S. supported 1970s war for Afghanistan.
At a conference conducted by the Nobel Institute in 1995, a high level group of former US and Soviet officials faced off over the question: Why did the Soviets invade Afghanistan? Former National Security Council staff member Dr. Gary Sick established that the U.S. had resigned Afghanistan to the Soviet sphere of influence years before the invasion. So why did the US choose an ideologically biased position when there were any number of verifiable fact-based explanations for why the Soviets had invaded?
To former CIA Director Stansfield Turner, responsibility could only be located in the personality of one specific individual. "Brzezinski's name comes up here every five minutes; but nobody has as yet mentioned that he is a Pole." Turner said. "[T]he fact that Brzezinski is a Pole, it seems to me was terribly important."
What Stansfield Turner was saying in 1995 was that Brzezinski's well-known hatred of Russia led him to take advantage of the Soviet's miscalculation. But it wasn't until the 1998 Nouvel Observateur interview that Brzezinski boasted that he had provoked the invasion by getting Carter to authorize a Presidential finding to intentionally suck the Soviets in six months before they even considered invading.
Yet, despite Brzezinski's admission, Washington's entire political spectrum continued to embrace his original false narrative that the Soviets had embarked on a world conquest.
For Brzezinski, getting the Soviets to invade Afghanistan was an opportunity to shift Washington toward an unrelenting hard line against the Soviet Union. By using covert action, he created the conditions needed to provoke a Soviet defensive response which he'd then used as evidence of unrelenting Soviet expansion. However, once his exaggerations and lies about Soviet intentions became accepted, they found a home in America's imagination and never left.
The Brzezinski-drafted Carter Doctrine put the U.S. into the Middle East with the Rapid Deployment Force, China became engaged as a US military ally and détente with the Soviet Union was dead.
The Polish born Brzezinski represented the ascendency of a radical new breed of xenophobic Eastern and Central European intellectual bent on holding Soviet/American policy hostage to their pre-World War II world view. His early support for expanding NATO into Eastern Europe and Ukraine was opposed by 46 senior foreign policy advisors who referred to it in a letter to President Clinton as "a policy error of historic proportions."
Yet in 1999, the Clinton administration, urged on by what Time Magazine described as "Ethnic lobbying groups such as the Polish American Congress," began implementing the plan.
US policy since that time has operated in a delusion of triumphalism that both provokes international incidents and then capitalizes on the chaos. A destabilizing strategy of sanctions against Russia, the American military's training of the Ukrainian National Guard, US troops parading armored vehicles within 300 yards of Russia's border and warlike statements by NATO leaders can only mean the US is committed to Brzezinski's strategy of seizing the "Pivot Area" and holding it.
Today it's Brzezinski's son Ian who finds Moscow at the root of America's problems regardless of the facts. He recently recommended to the Senate Armed Services Committee that the authority to make war on Russia should be taken out of President Obama's hands and given to NATO's top commander, General Phillip Breedlove; a man accused by the German government of exaggerating the Russian threat in eastern Ukraine by spreading "dangerous propaganda".
The time has come for the American public to be let in on what US foreign policy has become and to decide whether the Brzezinski family's personal obsession with fulfilling Mackinder's directive for conquering the pivot of Eurasia at any cost, should be America's goal as well.